The practice of constructing hypnotic realities by Korkie, Juan
THE PRACTICE OF CONSTRUCTING HYPNOTIC REALITIES 
by 
JUAN KORKIE 
submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
in the subject 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
SUPERVISOR: PROF DP FOURIE 
JUNE 2002 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
To my participants, for their willingness to explore the magical world of 
perception. 
To my friends, without who's nagging and support this dissertation would 
never be completed. 
To David Fourie, for teaching me how to construct realities without illusion 
and without fear. 
ii 
DEDICATION 
To Michelle Beneke with bittersweet remembrance. I know now that what we 
create in our words and actions become realities - realities that are much 
more difficult to unmake than create. It is the fool that treats this lightly, and 
an even greater fool that chooses the nightmare over the magic. I have been 
both. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
CHAPTER 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................... ii 
Dedication .............................................................................................. iii 
Table of content .................................................................................... iv 
Summary ............................................................................................... vi 
Keywords ............................................................................................. vii 




Subjects and participants 
Conceptual roots 
Overview of discussion 
2 CONSTRUCTIVIST THINKING ............................................................... 7 
Reality is a description 
A description is how we specify and conserve ourselves 
Social realities are the product of intersecting descriptions 
Describing descriptions is useful in making new descriptions 
Conclusion 
iv 
3 SETTING UP THE HYPNOTIC REALITY .............................................. 27 
Using conversation to construct a consensual domain 
Co-constructing the hypnotic idea 
Using the ordinary to constitute and initiate the hypnotic description 
Punctuating the boundaries 
Moving towards engagement of the totality of the person 
Modifying the behavior of the hypnotist 
Using observers to qualify subject behaviors as hypnotic 
Conclusion 
4 EXPANDING THE HYPNOTIC REALITY .............................................. 51 
Defining expansion 
Examples of hypnotic behaviors 
Examples of hypnotic dialogues 
Conclusion 
5 FACILITATING THE COHERENCE OF THE HYPNOTIC 
REALITY ............................................................................... 68 
Defining coherence 
Some qualities of a coherent hypnotic system 
Conclusion 
6 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 78 
Implications 
Contextualization 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 91 
v 
SUMMARY 
This dissertation presents a constructivist discussion of the experiences of the 
author in doing hypnosis. It explores the practice of hypnosis as a progression 
of behavioral changes by the hypnotist in facilitating the initiation, expansion 
and coherence of the hypnotic domain. These changes include punctuating 
and redefining everyday experiences and environmental events as hypnotic, 
and engaging participants in discussions based on the hypnotic logic. 
Hypnosis is defined as social and cognitive domain that is specified in 
language, and maintained by the embodied descriptions of participants. It is 
described how the hypnotic system evolves in terms of complexity, 
distinctness and functional integrity, and how this reflects the structurally 
determined fit between its members. In this system the hypnotist facilitates 
the development of the hypnotic description as a viable domain of existence 
that is experienced as real and all-inclusive. In conclusion some constructivist 
ideas for research, treatment and training are presented before constructivist 
















This text is the culmination of a desire to demystify hypnosis for myself. The 
desire to write this text arose at the beginning of my studies in psychology. 
My interest in hypnosis led me to books and articles, many of which provided 
detailed explanations of induction methods and techniques to bring about 
hypnotic phenomena. Yet these descriptions did not satisfy my desire for 
understanding the actual process involved, the actual art of bringing about 
hypnosis. It was only later, being exposed to systemic and constructivist 
thinking, that the process started to make sense. In this dissertation I have 
attempted to provide a description of this process. This description is offered 
as one of many possible descriptions, yet one that has been useful to me. 
An invitation 
"[A]ll that we can do in a conversation [ ... ] is to seduce 
our interlocutor to accept as valid the implicit premise that 
define[s] the domain in which our argument is 
operationally valid" (Maturana, 1988, p.43). 
All texts and research are done within a specific epistemology. An 
epistemology is a theory of knowledge, or more accurately, a theory of 
knowing. It refers to the specific process by which we build up what we know. 
It is our idiosyncratic way of organizing our involvement in the world in order 
to make sense of it. As such, to understand any text, the text has to be 
considered against the background of implicit assumptions and premises on 
which it is based. If the reader does not contextualize a text in such a way, 
he/she may find that it does not make sense, or does not fit with what he/she 
has read elsewhere. This dissertation is written within a constructivist 
epistemology, and I would like to invite the reader to accept the assumptions 




The aim of this dissertation is to present the reader with an organization of my 
experiences in constructing hypnotic realities in a way that is understandable 
and accessible. The emphasis in this construction, and also in this 
presentation, is on the changes in the behavior of the hypnotist. As was said, 
this presentation and organization is embedded in a specific epistemology 
and will only make sense if this epistemology is accepted as valid. By making 
the statements that are made in this text I do not suggest that this is the only 
possible way of describing hypnosis. Given the ideas of constructivism, I am 
perfectly aware that many different descriptions exist and are useful. I will not, 
however, attempt to draw comparisons between such approaches and the 
one presented here, whether it is on the level of praxis or epistemology. For 
this, the reader is referred elsewhere (Fourie, 1991 b, 1991 c, 1995, 1996b, 
1998a; Fourie & Lifschitz, 1985, 1988). 
Constructivist research 
The aim of constructivist research is not to discover underlying principles or 
facts, but rather to make sense (Fourie, 1996c). This dissertation represents 
that process of making sense. Making sense does not mean that the 
researcher attempts to control and manipulate variables, nor to arrive at 
objective facts and statements. Constructivist research is a process of 
consensually developing "results" or descriptions that are useful in one way or 
another. The constructivist researcher is aware that his/her research is his/her 
contribution in constructing a specific set of ideas. As such it is not a process 
of objective discovery, but of invested creation. This does not disqualify the 
findings, especially since the findings will only be validated if they make sense 
within the larger context in which the research takes place. Instead, it allows 
for a more active role of the researcher in that the process of research is a 
process of making sense and validating ideas. It is not a process taken lightly 
because, as in research embedded in other epistemologies, findings are 
consensual realities and as such have real implications for those involved in 
the research. 
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The aim of this dissertation is to arrive at a complex description of the 
construction of hypnosis in terms of the actions and distinctions of the 
hypnotist. In developing an experiential basis for this description I made use 
of a variety of hypnosis sessions and subjects. In these sessions the 
emphasis was on my own descriptive behaviors in interaction with the 
participants. The motivation for this emphasis being that, given a 
constructivist epistemology, I am only capable of changing my own behaviors. 
The approach was one of immersion, of seeking out diverse settings and 
subjects that posed me with complex sets of variables. Within these settings I 
experimented, improvising with changing my own behavior in various ways. 
No attempt was made to control the behaviors of participants. Instead, 
emphasis was on making specific contributions to the context and being 
curious to see which parts of my contribution were selected by the 
participant(s) in elaborating the hypnotic description. 
Subjects and participants 
My subjects or participants in constructing hypnotic realities were selected 
using the criteria that they must present with variables, in the form of ideas, 
needs, etc, that pose a challenge. The challenge was to find novel ways of 
changing my own behaviors in establishing a fit with them. This fit is what is 
required in establishing a consensual domain (see Chapter 3). Participants 
were also selected on the grounds of availability and willingness to 
participate. As said, I aimed at including as many differences as possible. 
Participants ranged in age from seven to fifty-eight, came from diverse 
cultural and national backgrounds, socio-economic groups and professional 
fields. They furthermore differed in their expectations and past experience of 
hypnosis. Participants also differed in their relation to myself, ranging from 
relatives and friends to clients. Throughout this dissertation reference will be 
made to various interactions with subjects. Given the emphasis on the 
descriptive behaviors of the hypnotist, as discussed in the previous section, a 
detailed presentation and introduction of the subjects is not considered 
relevant and is hence omitted. 
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Conceptual roots 
The process of developing ideas continually evolves. Looking back at the 
development of my own ideas as preparation for writing this text, I see many 
influences in the form of lectures, discussions and books. These ideas may 
not be directly related to what is written here, yet they constitute the 
conceptual roots upon which current ideas are based. Most of these ideas, 
and the authors from which they came, are not referred to in this text. Not to 
include them will claim for myself that which belongs to others. Some of these 
authors were Keeney (1979, 1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1988, 1990), Bateson 
(1972, 1979), Haley (1963, 1984), Minuchin (1974), Watzlawick, Beavin and 
Jackson (1967) as well as Selvini-Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin and Prata 
(1975). The ideas of these authors played a central role in the development of 
my thinking about the complexities of social realities. They all present, in one 
way or another, a way of looking at the world that deviates from an 
epistemology of realism (Fourie, 1996c) and seek to arrive at a more complex 
understanding of who we are with others in the world. It is this way of looking 
for the social and cognitive complexities of phenomena that underlies this 
dissertation. 
Overview of discussion 
This dissertation describes the praxis of constructing hypnotic realities as 
embodied descriptions, based on my own explorations in the field. These 
explorations were directed and organized by the epistemological assumption 
that the only components of interaction that we have some degree of control 
over are our own actions and distinctions. The practice of constructing 
hypnotic realities described here hence reflects my own attempts at 
immersing myself in complex situations and then trying to develop flexibility, 
complexity and spontaneity within those settings. This dissertation describes 
the ideas that I found useful in making sense of my own· immersion. These 




Chapter 2 introduces and explains the epistemology underlying not only this 
text, but also the behaviors of the hypnotist, in constructing hypnotic realities. 
It introduces the idea of reality as one of many possible descriptions. This 
description is a shared reality that comes into being through our interaction, 
especially in language. It is functional in that it allows us to conserve our 
identity and group membership. A description as such is not a cognitive 
artifact but an embodied set of ideas, inclinations, dispositions and habits with 
which we organize our place and participation in the world. 
Setting up the hypnotic reality 
Chapter 3 applies the idea of reality as description. This idea is used to 
explore how hypnosis, as a different description, is introduced and defined. 
This is done through conversation that consensually defines, especially in 
terms of ideas, what the nature of the hypnotic description will be. Emphasis 
is on the process by which the hypnotist manages his/her own behavior in 
describing and organizing the attributes of the hypnotic situation. These 
attributes include the physical setting, ideas and expectations of participants. 
This organization, especially in terms of distinctions, aims to disrupt the 
subject's habitual way of organizing perceptions and present a new 
description of events and experiences. 
Expanding the hypnotic reality 
Chapter 4 builds on the actions and distinctions described in Chapter 3. 
Emphasis is now on the expansion, or filling, of the hypnotic situation. This is 
done, firstly, by developing a repertoire of behaviors and, secondly, by means 
of creative hypnotic dialogues. The hypnotic repertoire is not limited to 
behaviors traditionally known as hypnotic, but can include any behavior that is 
defined and/or accepted by participants as hypnotic. In developing this 
repertoire emphasis is on including the totality of the participants. Hypnotic 
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dialogues are created through engaging subjects in creative conversations 
that draw on the logic of the hypnotic description. 
Facilitating coherence of the hypnotic reality 
Chapter 5 focuses on the evolving nature of the hypnotic description and the 
subject's acquisition of the ability to make hypnotic distinctions. It describes 
how the hypnotic description emerges as a complex interconnected social 
system in which its participants are invested. The coherent hypnotic system is 
characterized by being embodied in the emotions, actions, movements, ideas 
and dialogues of its participants. Coherence is hence about establishing a 
veritable reality defined in language as hypnosis. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 6 presents some recommendations for training, treatment and 
research. The remainder of the chapter contextualizes the dissertation, 





"We are perceivers. We are an awareness; we are not 
objects; we have no solidity. We are boundless. The 
world of objects and solidity is a way of making our 
passage on earth convenient. It is only a description that 
was created to help us. We, or rather our reason, forget 
that the description is only a description and thus we 
entrap the totality of ourselves in a vicious circle from 
which we rarely emerge in our lifetime" (Castaneda, 
197 4, p.95, italics in original). 
"This is the beauty, and the frustration, of constructivism. 
What we qualify and define becomes really 'real', not only 
to ourselves, but to all people concerned" (Fourie, 1998a, 
p.119). 
The above two quotes capture the essence of the thinking that underlies this 
dissertation. This can be condensed into four ideas. Firstly, that what we 
know as reality is a complex description that we create through our actions. 
Secondly, that this description is embodied in our totality, and is constituted 
by every part of what we call human. Thirdly, that this description is shared 
and forms the basis of what we understand as social life. Finally, that the 
knowledge of all of the above is an opportunity to construct a different 
description, if that is what we want. These ideas or statements will be used in 
organizing this chapter. 
Reality is a description 
What we know is a description of the world 
That which we believe to be reality is a description of the world. Saying this 
does not invalidate what we call "real", but rather contextualizes the 
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certainties of our daily existence. It is with certainty that we meet our world. 
We do not doubt that there are things that are right and wrong, better and 
worse, common and strange. We may be able to point out what other people 
say and think and see their one-sided certainty in themselves, but very rarely 
do we catch a glimpse of the more subtle certainties that constitute our own 
description of the world. When it comes to ideas, emotions, convictions, the 
way we walk, the way we don't like coffee, the way we call ourselves by our 
name and know what that means - about this there is no doubt, it is real. To 
us. And maybe to a large group of people. But it still is a description. 
There are many possible descriptions of the world 
That there are many descriptions of the world is no secret. The "clear 
evidence of the irreducible pluralism" (Chiari & Nuzzo, 1988, p.91) of the 
world surrounds us. It used to be fashionable to speak of the world as a 
multiverse (Maturana, 1988) to convey this idea. Our world is richer and more 
complex than what we usually acknowledge since it is constituted by 
numerous intersecting descriptions. Knowing that our certainties are just a 
description helps to contextualize our world. This is done by placing it on 
equal footing with all the other descriptions. This can be said in a different 
way: A description is a specific way of making sense of the world, or 
organizing it so that we can find a way of relating to it. Saying there are many 
descriptions implies that there are different ways of making sense of the 
world, of ascribing ideas and meanings to events, of establishing certainties 
(Fourie, 1993, 1997). 
We usually don't want to know that there are many possible descriptions 
It is usually not easy to deal with the idea that there are many possible 
descriptions. The idea erodes the certainty with which we hold our 
convictions, theories, and "psychotheologies" (Keeney in Cecchin, Lane & 
Ray, 1992, p.x), in different domains of our everyday life. To acknowledge 
that what we take as real as being just one of many possible perceptions, 
threatens our way of being in the world. At the same time the only solace is 
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that, if we were to change our idea of the world, we will just be substituting 
one description for another. The "real" is beyond our reach. 
A description is a way of organizing the world 
Our ideas about the world are resistant to change because we have difficulty 
dealing with the notion that our certainties are only relative descriptions. Our 
descriptions are functional and serve as a metaphor with which we organize 
our world and our experiences (Cecchin et al., 1993). This organization, in 
turn, provides us with, and constitutes, the logical implications for how we 
should interact with this world. Our description can therefore be seen as an 
interface, such as we find on computers, which serves as a manageable way 
of dealing with otherwise overwhelming and incomprehensible information. 
"Knowledge can now be seen as something that the 
organism builds up in the attempt to order the as such 
amorphous flow of experience by establishing repeatable 
experiences and relatively reliable relations between 
them" (Von Glasersfeld, 1984, p.34 ). 
Descriptions reduce the world and ourselves 
Whenever anything is organized, it is at an expense. The actions of 
organizing, explaining, categorizing, etc slowly make the world smaller and 
less complex. We make it more understandable, familiar and predictable. At 
the same time we also reduce ourselves and our possible ways of thinking, 
feeling and expressing. The way in which we experience and can possibly 
interact with others and the world becomes limited. What we gain is the ability 
to say "I" and know what it means. In order to say that, though, we have 
already reduced it in terms of what it could possibly be. 
We maintain our description by repeating it to ourselves 
Castaneda (1968, 1974) speaks about the internal dialogue and how the 
world appears to us as it does, only because we are constantly talking to 
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ourselves about it being that way. Hence, we keep our description in place 
through constantly generating descriptions that confirm our descriptions, and 
we do this by our continual flow of self-talk and the ideas that we use to make 
sense of events. In the same way we can provide reasons, examples, 
arguments and quotes to prove to others and ourselves that the world fits our 
description. As such, we are extremely efficient at maintaining our description 
as our organization of the world and in turn our certainty of who we are and 
what we should do. 
A description selects our behaviors and vice versa 
Descriptions are not only mental constructs or abstractions (this will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter). All descriptions play a crucial 
role in selecting or setting the stage for certain behaviors to occur. Another 
way of saying this is that a description can be understood as a complex 
matrix of ideas, words, emotions, actions, etc. This means that any 
description, by virtue of the above statement, will include and exclude certain 
behaviors. Let me provide a practical everyday example. A description that 
there is a deity that governs the world will include certain emotions in certain 
contexts (church, synagogue, temple, etc), certain interactions (with the 
priest, minister, pastor, etc), certain behaviors (prayer, devotions, reading 
religious texts). At the same time certain behaviors are excluded. All these 
components are connected in a specific way on an individual level. Hence the 
presence of one (a religious relic) may trigger certain thoughts, feelings and 
bodily dispositions, as well as sequences of actions and interactions. 
A description builds up an experiential world 
A description hence serves as an interface or blueprint in organizing our 
behavior by making certain behaviors more or less likely. On a larger scale all 
these behaviors, in their everyday enactment and selection, build up an 
experiential world. It is a world because, over time, these experiences 
become what we refer to as our all-encompassing certainty. They are the 
enactment of a description of the world, and are constituted by all our 
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interactions (Maturana, 1980b ). Our description is therefore our complete and 
exhaustive experiential world. Yet, the person engaged in this world does not 
necessarily realize that his/her world is different (and no better or worse) than 
someone else's world. 
One needs irreverence to deal with the idea of many descriptions 
As long as we try and validate or disqualify any description of the world, we 
are still engaged in the same process that sets up distinctions as certainties. 
Such a process maintains a specific description but fails to acknowledge, and 
deal with, the complexity of the world. By acting with irreverence (Cecchin et 
al., 1992) for any specific description it is possible to take descriptions less 
seriously and not become engaged in a process of either qualifying or 
disqualifying them. Irreverence implies seeing descriptions for what they are, 
descriptions. It also means that one realizes that all descriptions are 
organizational tools and hence potentially useful. 
Acting irreverently but employing temporary certainties 
The attitude that is proposed in this text is a disregard for descriptions as 
"truths" coupled with an awareness of their functional value. In interacting with 
the world a description is hence considered pragmatically and may be used 
as a "temporary certainty" (Cecchin et al., 1993). This means that a person 
will act "as if' he/she holds a specific description of the world, and he/she will 
do so because enacting a description will effect how the world will appear. 
The attitude proposed is that of treating descriptions as pragmatic devices for 
attaining certain actions and descriptions of the world, rather than 
succumbing to the illusion of any description's inherent realness. Such an 
attitude allows for an appreciation of the role of descriptions without the 
emotional pull and investment to validate any specific one. 
A description is not passively received. but actively constructed 
The implication of the attitude of irreverence described above, is that we 
actively select our description, yet we do not always realize our own 
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participation in doing so. A description is neither something that we passively 
receive through our senses (Von Glasersfeld, 1988), nor is it"[ ... ] a passively 
received set of experiences from a stable world" (Goolishian & Winderman, 
1988, p.131 ). Descriptions or knowledge are not beyond our organisms, but 
are determined by us. And as organizing metaphors they determine how the 
world appears to us (Maturana & Varela, 1992). We are not merely imprinted 
on, or instilled, with ideas, desires, wishes and identity. These are all 
constructed through our being in the world. The process that determines this 
being in the world will be discussed later. It is through our engagement with 
the world, our active participation in it, that we build up a history and 
repertoire of experiences. These experiences constitute what we tell 
ourselves when we say we "know" something. What we "know" is therefore 
an act of engagement rather than a distinct piece of information that is 
obtained. This is "active knowing" (Von Glasersfeld, 1988). 
We like to think that our description is "out there" 
It is through being immersed in the world and our experience of the world that 
we arrive at our description, or our knowledge, of the world. And our 
description is the matrix of thoughts, ideas, convictions, habits, interactions, 
emotions, gestures, etc connected through complex sequences and 
developed in interaction with the world. Yet in talking about these we talk as if 
this knowledge is out there. We say we know something as if we grasped 
something distinct and separate from us, and now have a firm hold on it. 
Knowledge has nothing to do with what we think we are holding, and 
everything with the holding itself. Yet we prefer to separate the act of knowing 
or making sense from that which we know or are making sense of. This 
happens not only in our everyday life, but also in the domain of science, as 
Von Glasersfeld and Varela (1987) point out: 
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"nearly all thinkers who have pondered problems of 
epistemology have explicitly or implicitly adopted the view 
that the activity of "knowing" begins with a cut between 
the cognizing subject and the object to be known" (p. 36, 
37). 
We define our description by making distinctions 
Reference has been made to a process whereby some behaviors are 
selected and others not. In order for this selection to take place, the behavior, 
whether it is an idea, emotion, movement, etc, first has to be brought into 
existence. It was said earlier that what we know as reality does not exist 
independently of us describing it as such. It is through making distinctions that 
we indicate something from an otherwise random background (Bateson, 
1972). Distinctions are made through constructing ideas of difference. By 
making a distinction, something becomes possible. This can also be said by 
saying that we bring ideas, objects, emotions etc into existence by pointing 
them out, by punctuating some type of difference that sets them apart from 
the background. In the words of Maturana (1980a), "existence is always the 
result of an operation of distinction performed by an observer" (p.50). 
The description combines the described and the describer in one 
By now it should be clear that we live our knowing or description, or as Dell 
(1985) puts it, "every biological entity both has and is a way of knowing" (p.5, 
italics in original). What has been called a description here, and can be called 
our way of knowing, is the process of making moment to moment distinctions 
that brings forth a world (Maturana & Varela, 1992). This is a world of 
experience that is actively constructed and confirmed through our continual 
engagement in describing the world. This describing therefore rolls the 
describer and the described into an inseparable unity. A unity where it can no 
longer be determined at what time the describer brings forth a description, or 
the description brings forth the describer. Describing is hence a circuit of 
mutual definition and validation, but also of entrapment and restriction. 
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What happens when the description changes? 
Our description of the world is our way of being and as such involves the 
totality of ourselves. Through the active process by which we build up this 
description, we inevitably reduce the world and ourselves by making it 
manageable, predictable and consistent. We usually do not know this, nor 
want to hear it. This having been said, the reader may ask what happens if 
our description, our way of knowing, is interrupted. What happens is the core 
intent of the praxis described in this text, and Castaneda (197 4) formulates 
this both beautifully and dramatically: 
"Whenever the dialogue stops, the world collapses and 
extraordinary facets of ourselves surface, as though they 
had been kept heavily guarded by our words" (p.38). 
A description is how we specify and conserve ourselves 
In the preceding section the idea of the world as description was introduced. 
This idea was expanded by explaining how our descriptions are functional in 
bringing forth a complete experiential world. The following section will 
introduce a specific description of how and why the latter is done. 
We define ourselves 
A person "continuously generates and specifies [his/her] own organization 
through [his/her] operation as a system of production of [his/her] own 
components" (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p.81 ). This process is also known as 
autopoiesis, or self-creation. Another way of stating the same thought is that 
we are who and what we are because we specify, organize and conserve 
ourselves in that way. What we therefore do when we realize our autopoiesis 
is to specify and maintain our ability to construct our organization through 
determining the components that constitute that organization. This means that 
all our actions as human beings have as their aim the realization of our 
autopoiesis, and hence whatever we do is an act of generating and specifying 
who we are. 
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Nothing we do is trivial 
Autopoiesis, or the continual definition of ourselves, is invariant. All our 
behavior is the active statement of our autopoiesis (Maturana, 1975). We 
never engage in behaviors that are not functional in specifying and 
conserving our identity .. Nothing that we do, whether it is actions, thoughts, 
emotions or dialogue, is trivial. All behavior, and hence all change, is 
determined by our conservation of ourselves as self-determining entities 
(Maturana & Varela, 1980). No part of the world that we call "reality" is trivial. 
Every part, whether it is considered an objective reality outside of us, or our 
personal experience, forms part of the continual process by which we define 
ourselves. 
Everything that we do is internally determined 
It follows from the above that, just as no part of our description is trivial, every 
part is functional. This function relates to our constitution as autopoietic 
beings. Hence everything we do is determined by our autopoiesis and as 
such is internally determined. This is called structural determinism. Every 
behavior is determined by our structure and, at any specific moment, by the 
specific interaction of the properties that constitute our structure (Maturana, 
1987a). A person selects certain behaviors and others not. Such a selection 
is completely determined by the properties of the components that constitute 
the person's organization. It can therefore be said that the choices a person 
make are solely determined by the criteria that they are functional in 
conserving the specific organization of the person. 
We define our invariant organization through flexible structure 
A living system is actively engaged in the process of realizing its organization 
that constitutes it as a particular system - this has been defined as 
autopoiesis. Should the system be unable to realize its organization, it will 
cease to exist as a system of that particular class. Although the organization, 
which is the relations between different parts, is invariant, the same is not true 
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for its structure. The organization of a system is realized through its structure, 
and this occurs through continuous structural changes. Hence, the way in 
which a system is realized may vary, but not the act of being realized or the 
specific relations between structural parts that are conserved. Organization 
can be defined as the relations that are necessary in order for a system to 
exist, viz., that define it as a particular system or as having a specific class 
identity. The structure of a system refers to the actual relations and 
components that realize the organization, viz., the relations that constitute the 
system in the present and as such are invariant (Maturana, 1980b; Maturana 
& Varela, 1992). An example often used to describe the above is that of the 
tight-rope walker. The walker has to make continual small changes in order to 
maintain his/her balance. Hence he/she changes (by means of little balancing 
moves) in order to stay the same (to remain on the rope). 
We draw distinctions as a way of generating and specifying our organization 
Now we get back to the section about descriptions. I have said that the 
realization of our autopoiesis, or the act of specifying our own organization, is 
an invariant process to which all behavioral changes are in service. This 
process of specifying our own organization takes place through making 
distinctions. Distinctions are punctuations of difference that bring realities into 
existence. Our distinctions all combine to form a description of the world. Our 
distinctions are not, as has been made clear, determined by the outside 
world, since "information has no existence or meaning apart from that given to 
it by the system with which it interacts" (Dell, 1985). A description can 
therefore be defined as a complex functional matrix consisting of a multitude 
of distinctions. These distinctions are changes in behavior that conserve 
active self-determination. 
Our descriptions are the active realization of ourselves 
We are used to thinking about ourselves as having many ideas, preferences, 
opinions and beliefs. These are all distinctions comprising our description of 
the world. We do not typically think of these distinctions as functional, yet they 
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all constitute the active realization of our autopoiesis. Every act of noticing 
one thing and not another, by making one statement instead of another, is 
how we specify and conserve ourselves. We are continually and completely 
engaged in realizing our autonomy. We are autonomous because all changes 
that we undergo are subordinate to our conserving our organization 
(Maturana & Varela, 1980). Everything that we do works towards realizing our 
autopoiesis in the present (Maturana, 1975). We are purposeful, even when 
we are just talking about football, or commenting on something on the 
television. 
Realization means we are constantly reproducing the blueprint of who we are 
We each have a specific organization. This organization is a complex set of 
relations. And these refer to the specific way in which all the parts fit together 
to make us who we are, or constitute our organization. Who we are in terms 
of our organization is not defined by specific behaviors, but by the way all 
· these behaviors fit together into a unity or a whole. The specific behaviors or 
components are the actual manifestations of these governing relations. When 
we say we are constantly realizing our own organization it means that 
everything we do actively keeps these relations intact. We are not only 
constantly specifying who we are, but also reproducing that process of 
specifying ourselves. 
Our description selects what part of the world we notice and interact with 
Any interaction with the world involves change and all such change is 
determined by our structure at that instant (Maturana, 1987a). Furthermore, 
every behavior is a distinction and, as such, forms part of our description. Our 
description's function, as has been said, is to specify our organization or 
realize our autopoiesis. The implication of this is that the world is not a vast 
number of possibilities, since our structure "determines with which structural 
configurations of the medium it may interact" (Maturana, 1987a, p.336). 
Hence the world appears different to us all and we interact differently with it. 
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And this interaction is always governed by our structure, as the active way by 
which our self-definition is realized. 
Our descriptions create and specify the boundaries of our existence 
Our descriptions are constantly, through realizing our organization, 
constituting, specifying and maintaining its boundaries (Maturana, 1980a). By 
saying that we are constantly defining and maintaining our organization, viz., 
the unique set of relations that constitute us, we are also defining ourselves 
as a distinct entity. As we are constantly specifying and conserving our 
identity as a unique organization, we are also specifying that which is "not us" 
and hence create a boundary. 
Our descriptions conserve our adaptation 
Though we are completely determined by our own process of self-
organization, we also need to maintain our fit. with the world. We need to 
conserve our adaptation, even though our structure will determine how this is 
done. We cannot exist independently of the world in which we live. Our 
adaptation takes place through structural changes that establishes a unique 
fit with the properties of the world. When we conserve our adaptation, we 
conserve this structure determined fit that is invariant since we cannot exist 
independently of the world. 
We are continually changing 
Our organization is conserved through structural changes that are 
determined, in the moment, by the unique properties of our structural 
components. This makes us structurally plastic. A "structurally plastic system 
is [a system that) undergoes structural changes as a result of interacting with 
itself, its environment, or other structurally plastic systems" (Dell, 1985, p.13). 
As we are continually changing, we are also continually increasing in 
complexity. It is through change that we conserve our self-determined or 
autonomous organization and adaptation. What we conserve is invariant, but 
the way in which our autonomy is conserved, is through undergoing structural 
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changes. Our autonomy remains invariant, and is conserved as invariant 
through structural changes such as changes in ideas, actions, and what we 
do and do not notice in our daily living. 
Our description reflects our individuality and how that individuality is realized 
As mentioned above, we conserve our organization through structural 
changes. It is therefore possible to think of a series of structural changes that 
a system has undergone over time. This progression, or history, of structural 
changes, without loss of organization, is referred to as ontogeny (Maturana & 
Varela, 1992). 
"[O]ntogeny is both a statement of the individuality of 
living systems and the way through which this 
individuality is realized. As a process, ontogeny, then, is 
the statement of the becoming system that at each 
moment is the unity in its fullness, and does not 
constitute a transit from an incomplete [ ... ] state to a 
more complete or final one" (Maturana & Varela, 1980, 
p.87). 
Our description involves the totality of ourselves 
Where the first section explained how our description defines what we 
experience as real, this section explains that our description is the specific 
way that we conserve ourselves. It was also said that every change is in 
conservation of our autonomy. By now it may be clear that we are talking 
about a process that involves the totality of our organism, everything we are. 
It may also be clear why it was said in the previous section that we live our 
description. We are the embodied act of specifying and conserving ourselves 
through our distinctions. Our behavior is a complex circuit of continual 
specification that involves not only every part of ourselves, but which 
connects every part into a interactive functional unit. 
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Our descriptions are embodied in our lanquaqinq, bodyhood and emotioninq 
Our descriptions, as the conservation of our autonomy, are inseparable from 
what Maturana (1988) calls our languaging, bodyhood and emotioning. Our 
descriptions are not only constituted by ideas and words, but also by specific 
physiological experiences, bodily postures, emotions, as well as by internal 
and external discourses or conversations. Every part of who we are in our 
daily existence constitutes our description, and it does so as a complex 
interconnected and interactive matrix that conserves our autonomy through 
the specific relations realized. 
"Human life is involved upon itself in the flow of the 
recursive dynamic coupling of language, emotioning and 
bodyhood; whatever we language as we flow in our 
emotioning becomes our bodyhood and the world as we 
live as human beings, and our recursive consensual co-
ordinations of actions in the flow of our emotioning as we 
live the world we live, constitutes our languaging" 
(Maturana, 1988, p.81 ). 
The components of our descriptions are interconnected in sequences 
It follows from the above that the parts of our description or experience of the 
world are interconnected. A change in one part or component affects the rest 
of our embodied description. These interconnections are not random but 
highly structured, as well as highly individual. What may therefore appear as 
the same input or stimulus will elicit completely different responses from 
different people. A certain idea may be connected with a specific 
physiological state and emotion. These form complex connections and 
sequences by which we make sense of the world and organize our behavior 
in it. Castaneda (1971, 1977) utilizes an understanding of these sequences 
by deliberately changing his physical gestures and thereby not only effecting 
a change in his actual appearance, but activating a whole sequence of 
thoughts and perceptions. What we take as an objective response to the 
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world is, in fact, a specific sequence by which we organize ourselves. These 
sequences organize our behavior in that they specify how we will act. 
Whatever we do is hence an action determined and "cued" by such a 
sequence of interconnected ideas, thoughts, feelings and sensations: 
"[ ... ] that which we distinguish when we distinguish 
unique emotions in daily life are dynamic body 
dispositions for actions [ ... ] that specify at any moment 
the domains of actions in which the organisms move. 
Thus, all [ ... ] behavior takes place in a domain of actions 
supported and specified at any moment by some emotion 
or mood" (Maturana, 1988, p.49). 
Social realities are the product of intersecting descriptions 
Our embodied descriptions are social realities 
We do not usually conceive of our thoughts, emotions and bodily events as 
functional in any way. And perhaps even less than that do we think of this 
functionality in terms of conserving our fit with others. Our embodied 
descriptions are social realities in that they maintain the adaptation with the 
social world, as it does with the physical and other domains of which we are 
members. This coherence with the people and contexts with which we 
interact is maintained invariantly (Maturana, 1987b ). As such our descriptions 
exist in interaction with others. A description is, therefore, a social reality that 
is also the intersection of different descriptions. This does not change that it is 
structurally determined. Descriptions conserve our membership of the 
domains in which we exist. As such it provides predictability in how we 
interact with others by constituting a specific identity with those people. This 
identity can also be described as a specific set of sequences. These 
sequences are connected with the sequences of conservation of the other. 
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The changes that take place in social settings are structurally determined 
It follows from the above that our social interactions, like all other behavior, is 
structurally determined. The multitude of gestures, conversations, emotions 
and actions that we engage in with others are still conservative behaviors. 
They are behavioral changes that are structurally determined in order to 
preserve our autonomy. As such there is no exchange of ideas or information 
and mutual influencing taking place. What we experience in interaction are 
perceptions constructed autonomously and do not reflect realities "out there" 
(Fourie, 1995). Our behaviors are essentially changes undertaken from one 
moment to another. They are not determined by the person(s) we interact 
with, even though we tell ourselves that they are. The sense that we make of 
interactions is functional and helps us to conserve ideas about both ourselves 
and them. And these ideas, in turn, conserve our autonomy. 
Recurrent interactions lead to structural congruence between people 
When people interact over time a structural congruence emerges between the 
changes they undergo individually. A pattern emerges of the type of structural 
changes that they undergo when they are with that person. Such a pattern is 
specified and conserved as a reality between people and is constituted by 
individually determined changes on the part of each participant. This process 
is called structural coupling (Maturana & Varela, 1992), the pattern of 
changes that each undergoes in interaction with the other. These changes 
are also influenced by the history of interacting with the other person, which is 
called co-ontogenic structural coupling (Maturana, 1987a). The history of 
changes in interaction determines what future changes of state can take 
place and are possible with that person, as each becomes a medium for the 
realization of the other (Maturana, 1978). 
Structural congruence leads to the creation of consensual domains 
Over time, the interactions between people give rise to co-ontogenic 
structural coupling. This coupling involves "mutual operative restrictions" 
(Maturana, 1975, p. 321) that take place between them without loss of their 
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separate organizations. The domain that arises through this process of 
mutual restrictions is called a consensual domain. A consensual domain can 
be described as a "a network of sequences of mutually triggering interlocked 
conducts [or behaviors]" (Maturana, 1978, p.47). This means that the 
structural changes that take place between people "correspond to each other 
in interlocked sequences" (Maturana, 1975, p.326). A consensual domain is a 
domain of interlocked sequences of structural change. Each person, through 
his/her autonomy, interacts selectively with certain structural components of 
the other. As such they select and restrict the possible changes of each other 
within that relationship. A consensual domain, in returning to its origin, is 
distinguished on the grounds of the ontogeny that constitutes it (Maturana, 
1987a). 
Over time a way of coordinating behaviors evolve between people 
From the interaction between people there arises consensual behavior. This 
behavior is the result of their mutual perturbations and results in structurally 
determined changes of state. When such consensual behavior becomes 
sequential and coordinated, it is called linguistic behavior (Kenny, 1989; 
Maturana, 1975). A linguistic domain is a domain of consensual co-
ordinations of behavior. These co-ordinations specify what should take place 
in interactions in relation to the environment and in relation to the participants 
(Maturana, 1987a). The result of this is described by Maturana (1978): "an 
established linguistic domain is a system of communication that reflects a 
behavioral homomorphism resulting from structural coupling" (p.54 ). 
Language arises as the co-ordination of co-ordinative behaviors 
Linguistic behavior is the consensual co-ordination of behavior. When this is a 
recurrent process, language arises as linguistic behavior about linguistic 
behavior (Kenny, 1989). "Language appears when the operations in a 
linguistic domain result in co-ordinations of actions about actions that pertain 
to the linguistic domain itself' (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p.209-210, italics in 
original). Language is therefore a consensual domain of co-ordinations of co-
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ordinations of actions and distinctions that is constituted through the recurrent 
co-ontogenic structural coupling of people. It is a "domain of mutual 
coherences" (Maturana, 1987b, p.81) where people change together and 
consensually create meanings and attributions. 
Language is how we co-exist with others 
Language, as a consensual domain of co-ordinations of co-ordinations of 
behaviors, arises "as a manner of coexistence of living systems" (Maturana, 
1987a, p.360). Language is therefore not about communicating information, 
or whatever other ideas we have about it: it is functional, as is every other 
part of our behavior and being in the world. We understand each other and 
can share a life space due to the way in which we organize our shared world 
with language. Language, as such, is an action that performs a specific set of 
co-ordinations. Language is also "the transformation of experience into the 
public domain and, as such, contains an important metaphor relationship to 
the connection between public and private experience" (Goolishian & 
Winderman, 1988, p.140). Hence through language we establish a fit 
between our internal dialogues and ideas, and the ideas of others. Not as 
exchange, but as a fit and way of conserving such ideas. What is real is made 
real through our interactions in language. Descriptions are social phenomena 
and it is in language that we see how the intersection of descriptions co-
construct language (Efran, Lukens & Lukens, 1990). 
Objects are the products of making distinctions between people 
Perhaps the most difficult assumption of a constructivist epistemology is that 
objects, too, are "linguistic distinctions of linguistic distinctions that obscure 
the actions they coordinate" (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p.210). This means 
that their existence independent of the actions that specify and distinguish 
them are not accessible to us. As such they are linguistic distinctions, the co-
ordination of behavior. Hence, by talking about the object, it has, inherent in 
our distinction of it as object, a co-ordination for how we should behave 
towards it. It was said that the behaviors that are coordinated are obscured. 
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We believe in the realness of the things that make up our perceptual world, 
forgetting that the only function is one that relates to our interaction with it. 
Objects are the tokens of the consensually formulated co-ordinations of co-
ordinations of behaviors (Maturana, 1987a). 
"Each configuration of operations of distinctions that the 
observer performs specifies a domain of reality as a 
domain of operational coherences of his or her praxis of 
living in which he or she brings forth particular kinds of 
objects through their application" (Maturana, 1988, p.31 ). 
Describing descriptions is useful in making new descriptions 
Everything that has been said so far is just another description 
So far it has been said that, everything that we take as real is a description. 
This description is consensually constructed and specified in language, but 
also exists as embodied in our emotions, thoughts and physical experiences. 
If the epistemology of constructivism is applied consistently, it also has to be 
assumed that this description is just another description. It is a description 
made by the observer. 
Knowing that descriptions are descriptions is useful 
Making descriptions, or becoming an observer, is a useful position. I have 
referred to irreverence and temporary certainty earlier in this text. By viewing 
behavior and interaction as the enactment of specific descriptions allows the 
observer the opportunity to modify his/her own behavior that will serve to 
select different descriptions in others. Descriptions are considered for their 
usefulness and treated with irreverence. In this regard I view constructivist 
thinking as a useful description given the aims of this dissertation. I 
temporarily embrace its assumptions "as if' I believe them and by doing so 
am capable of specifying, generating and validating a specific range of ideas, 
actions, and conversations. 
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Conclusion 
Constructivist thinking was introduced by means of four ideas. The first was 
that reality is a description constructed by us as a way of organizing our world 
of experience. It is an idea that is difficult to accept because it subverts the 
certainties by which we live. These certainties allow us to believe that what 
we see and experience is "out there", and not a reflection of our participation 
in the world. The second idea was that these descriptions are embodied in 
the totality of our emotions, ideas and physical existence, and are functional 
in conserving our identity and fit with the world. It was said that this 
conservation is invariant and is achieved through structurally determined 
changes. The third idea was that our descriptions are social realities that exist 
as a fit between people. The intersection of different descriptions leads to the 
organization of autonomous behaviors in the form of linguistic and language 
behaviors, as well as distinctions that bring forth the physical world as we 
know it. The last idea was that it is possible to describe descriptions, which is 
the position of the observer. This position requires irreverence towards 
descriptions as certainties, and consideration of descriptions as useful 
devices in bringing about new descriptions. The following three chapters will 
present hypnosis as one such description. The following quote by Castaneda 
(1972) will be used as introduction and useful metaphor to these chapters in 
order to point out three stages in developing a hypnotic description: 
"He [Don Juan] pointed out that everyone who comes 
into contact with a child is a teacher who incessantly 
describes the world to him, until the moment when the 
child is capable of perceiving the world as it is described. 
[ ... ] From that moment on, however, the child is a 
member. He knows the description of the world; and his 
membership becomes full-fledged [ ... ] when he is 
capable of making all the proper perceptual 
interpretations which, by conforming to that description, 
validate it" (Castaneda, 1972, p.8-9, italics in original). 
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CHAPTER 3 
SETTING UP THE HYPNOTIC REALITY 
"He [Don Juan] pointed out that everyone who comes 
into contact with a child is a teacher who incessantly 
describes the world to him, until the moment when the 
child is capable of perceiving the world as it is described. 
[ ... ] From that moment on, however, the child is a 
member. He knows the description of the world; and his 
membership becomes full-fledged [ ... ] when he is 
capable of making all the proper perceptual 
interpretations which, by conforming to that description, 
validate it" (Castaneda, 1972, p.8-9, author's emphasis, 
italics in original). 
In the preceding chapter constructivist thinking was presented. It was said 
that what we call reality is a description of the world that is generated both in 
and as our praxis of living. The same process is applied to understanding 
hypnosis and the construction of the hypnotic reality. That is to say that 
hypnosis is viewed as yet another social description that is brought forth 
through the same consensual behaviors by which we construct our everyday 
world. This chapter focuses specifically on the part of the hypnotic process 
concerned with initiating, or setting up, the hypnotic reality or description. The 
chapters to follow will discuss how this description, once defined, is expanded 
to become a veritable reality. 
Hypnosis has been defined as a consensual reality brought forth through the 
behavioral congruence that evolves between participants. This sets it apart as 
a distinct domain of interaction. This domain of interaction is made possible 
because it serves as a medium in which participants can conserve their 
autonomy. Hypnosis is therefore functional to all participants. As a 
consensual domain it is also characterized by specific linguistic and language 
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behaviors. The complex pattern that evolves and governs these behaviors 
also determines what actions and distinctions are made within hypnosis. 
This chapter emphasizes the distinctions and actions of the hypnotist in 
setting up the hypnotic reality through organizing his/her descriptions of the 
situation. It focuses on drawing distinctions that disrupt the subject's habitual 
description of the world and redefine events and experiences as hypnotic. 
This is done with reference to my own development in learning to create 
hypnotic descriptions. 
Using conversation to construct a consensual domain 
A key activity for me during hypnotic sessions is engaging the subject in 
different types of conversation. As discussed, nothing that we do is trivial. All 
our behaviors are directly related to the conservation of our autonomy. 
Conversation should therefore be seen in the same way. This section 
explores the value of engaging subjects in seemingly content-centered 
conversations in order to set subjects at ease. These conversations include 
discussions of the subjects' beliefs, previous experiences, fears and 
expectations. Such discussions are often useful in helping the novice 
hypnotist to overcome his/her own anxiety with the idea of "doing hypnosis". 
A conversation about hypnosis constructs a consensual domain 
The process of hypnosis begins prior to the event that punctuates or marks 
that interaction as hypnosis. The co-creation of the idea of hypnosis is nothing 
other than the process by which we construct a consensual domain. The 
reader may recall that consensual domains impose "mutual operative 
restrictions" (Maturana, 1975, p. 321) on all participants. The implication of 
this is that the hypnotic reality is a social reality in which certain behaviors are 
permitted and others are not. In the process of evolving this domain we are 
acquiring roles within which we will act. Even though these roles are 
autonomously created, they also serve as medium for the realization of the 
other. 
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Hypnosis as consensual domain is mutually restrictive 
Both the hypnotist and the subject enter the conversational domain with their 
unique ways of making distinctions. The conversation that takes place reflects 
the process of structural coupling. On the one hand it shows how those 
involved go through various structural changes in response to the 
perturbations they present to each other. On the other hand it lays down the 
foundation, at every moment, for further structural changes. That is to say, the 
conversation delineates what is possible and what is not, and constructs a 
language of distinctions that are, and will be, spoken. In short, it structures the 
how of the hypnotic reality and therefore the content is irrelevant. 
In the hypnotic domain different members make different distinctions 
Both the hypnotist and the subject agree about who can make what type of 
distinctions, although this agreement is not verbalized but takes place as part 
of the linguistic coordination of behaviors. For example, the hypnotist can 
make the complementary distinction of someone being in a light or deep 
trance. The subject can make the distinction of confirming such distinctions by 
saying afterwards that indeed, he/she felt it was very different from before, 
etc. These are the implicit parts that comprise the consensual domain and 
indicate how the hypnotic description as a consensual domain is a negotiation 
of coordinative behaviors. Talking can hence be seen as a linguistic anchor of 
coordinations. An informal conversation as part of the "preparation" for 
hypnosis can therefore be understood as a complex dialogue of co-
ordinations that establish a consensual domain. This consensual domain 
restricts the behaviors of everyone involved, and co-ordinates roles and 
corresponding behavioral repertoires. At the same time these roles and 
repertoires also serve the realization of the autonomy of all the participants. 
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Co-constructing the hypnotic idea 
The idea of hypnosis as the root of the hypnotic reality 
The hypnotic reality, as it evolves towards coherence and the all-
inclusiveness of the totality of the person, is not merely an idea. A 
consensually constructed idea, such as hypnosis, also impacts on how our 
specific conservation of our autonomy will include our emotions and 
physiology. The idea of hypnosis therefore sets the stage for the nature of the 
hypnotic reality that will evolve. Every hypnotic reality is unique since it is the 
unrepeatable structural coupling between people. The ideas held about 
hypnosis will influence the nature of the hypnotic reality that will evolve. As 
such it forms the starting point for the construction of an increasingly 
embodied description. 
All ideas are equally valid 
The hypnotist is not concerned when confronted by the variety of ideas about 
hypnosis presented by subjects. His/her own conceptualization does not 
adhere to or believe in any set of ideas, except that hypnosis is a co-
constructed reality. As such his/her actions are aimed at establishing a social 
reality rather than validating a reified idea. As Fourie (1996b) points out,"[ ... ] 
there are no "misconceptions" of hypnosis. All client conceptions are seen as 
equally valid and usable" (p.124 ). This stance means that the hypnotist does 
not see any use in "educating" the subject about what hypnosis "really" is. 
Instead, the hypnotist meets the subject's ideas with similar or fitting ideas 
that expand what is given and tie it into a useful hypnotic description. Ideas 
are the building blocks for the hypnotic description. The idiosyncrasy of the 
ideas that people bring to hypnosis means that every hypnotic description will 
be unique, reflecting the unique dialogue of ideas between subject and 
hypnotist. 
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Using ideas subjects bring about hypnosis 
"While the ideas of the participating parties can change in 
the course of the hypnotic session, it is a given fact that 
everybody enters the situation with particular, often 
idiosyncratic ideas about hypnosis and about his/her 
connection with hypnosis" (Fourie, 1996b, p.123). 
Subjects bring different and, as said in the above quote, idiosyncratic ideas to 
the hypnotic context. These ideas are connected to the actions and 
distinctions by which they conserve themselves. The ideas people have are, 
as all other ideas and behavior, part of their conservation of their autonomy. 
The fact that the context is defined as hypnosis does not change this. It is, 
hence, important that these ideas are not rejected or ignored. Ideas can be 
seen as the subject's bid for autonomy. If the idea or set of ideas can be 
conserved, it means that the subject can conserve his/her autonomy in the 
hypnotic description and can learn to make hypnotic distinctions. This is the 
aim of the hypnotist - to facilitate the construction of a description that serves 
as a medium for the conservation of autonomy. As such the participants 
(including the hypnotist) will be invested in the description. 
Ideas change through the course of hypnosis 
Implicit in the preceding discussion about the hypnotist's approach and use of 
ideas is that these ideas will continue to change as all participants undergo 
changes in establishing a consensual domain. Ideas form part of our structure 
that conserves our invariant organization, yet these ideas continue to change 
and evolve. It has been said previously that the ideas with which we enter the 
hypnotic situation are not trivial. The hypnotist treats all ideas as valid and 
functional. This does not mean that these ideas don't change - because they 
do. The changing of ideas can be seen as one of the structural changes that 
we undergo in order to conserve our autonomy. The constructivist hypnotist 
therefore neither reifies an idea, nor does he/she treat it as fixed and 
unchanging. Instead he/she sees it as a useful building block and attempts to 
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find a way of incorporating it into the hypnotic description. At the same time 
he/she knows that, once acknowledged, it is likely to change. It is because of 
his/her understanding of continual change that he/she does not attempt to fix 
meanings and ideas. 
The idea of hypnosis is a cooperative venture 
"This evolution of new ideas from original ideas is a 
cooperative, reciprocal venture involving everybody who 
partakes in the dialogue. Thus the dialogue can be 
viewed as a coevolutionary process through which a new 
"reality" is cooperatively constructed in and for that 
system" (Fourie, 1993, p.230). 
The above quote emphasizes that though everyone involved brings different 
ideas about what hypnosis is, these ideas undergo change over time. It is 
with ideas, among other processes, that the participants establish a fit with 
each other and with the hypnotic context. The uniqueness in a constructivist 
approach is that the hypnotist brings ideas that allow him/her to deliberately 
incorporate and utilize the ideas of the other participants. It remains, however, 
a process where neither participant determines the behavior (and specifically 
the distinctions) of the other, nor the idea that evolves. By selecting his/her 
own contribution to the dialogue the hypnotist does, however, determine 
which ideas from his/her side are available. He/she cannot determine the 
outcome, but he/she can determine his/her contribution. 
The hypnotist meets and contributes ideas with conviction 
The idea of relativity may be conceptually useful, but does not reflect the 
hypnotist's interactions with the subject regarding ideas. The hypnotist acts 
with conviction when talking to the subject about his/her ideas - going out of 
his/her way to validate and confirm (or add detail to) these ideas to enable a 
better fit with the hypnotic description. As such the interaction between 
participants takes the appearance of "evolving complex webs of meaning 
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within which [participants] then act as if [their] ascribed meanings were 
ontologically true" (Goolishian & Winderman, 1988, p.134, italics in original). 
The constructivist hypnotist does no homage to any reified idea of hypnosis. 
His/her actions of conviction are solely aimed at establishing a powerful and 
consensual idea. 
Previous experiences as accounts of past structural changes in hypnosis 
Offering of information about previous experiences with hypnosis is one of 
many ways in which ideas about hypnosis are brought into the hypnotic 
domain. An example of this came from my work with Chris. During our 
conversation about hypnosis he told me about his experience with two 
hypnotists who attempted hypnosis with him in a therapeutic setting. He 
described how their approach to him was disqualifying and underestimated 
his artistic abilities. He also stated that the hypnosis was terminated after a 
few sessions since it proved to be "unsuccessful". 
From the above it may be clear that what could be understood as a casual 
comment by Chris is an important bid for autonomy. He is making the appeal 
that the hypnotic reality, and especially the hypnotist, should be a medium 
through which he can conserve certain ideas about himself. These ideas 
included being a creative and artistic person that should not be hypnotized 
using a standard procedure. By offering this information, he was also giving 
an account of the type of structural changes he underwent. This is valuable to 
the hypnotist in organizing his/her own behavior in a way that will conserve 
certain ideas by interacting with the subject in a specific way, making certain 
structural changes unnecessary. In other words, the hypnotist should act in a 
way that confirms the subject and does not make it necessary for him to 
disqualify the hypnotist and the hypnosis. 
Using expectations about hypnosis 
Asking about the expectations that people bring to the hypnotic situation is 
useful. It provides a glimpse at the type of ideas that, if only on an intellectual 
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level, must help the person to conserve his/her adaptation and organization in 
one way or another. Such expectations are also useful to describe to the 
subject what will happen throughout the session. As such they are ideas 
about specific actions and distinctions by participants that may become 
possible. Needless to say this can be understood as a tentative bid to 
conserve their autonomy by means of such distinctions or behaviors. As has 
been said before, ideas change and become part of the dialogue of ideas. 
Nevertheless, using the expectations of the subject as a starting point 
validates those ideas and what they conserve. It also allows for the 
introduction of ideas from the hypnotist that are linked to that expectation, 
especially if it is a desirable expectation. 
Fourie (1991 a) gives an example of using expectations that are not desirable. 
When the subject may be afraid or very reluctant to engage in hypnosis for 
whatever reason, an opening is there for the hypnotist to withhold hypnosis. 
This validates the negative ideas and expectations by the subject, but joins 
with it in a way that makes the other option more likely to be accepted. This 
example shows how the idea of hypnosis itself can be used as a powerful tool 
to both "link with the presented ideas and to perturb them" (Fourie, 1996b, 
p.124 ). This type of work is only possible if the hypnotist does not reify 
hypnosis. 
Using the challenges of the subject 
Just as every behavior, whether it is an idea, action or emotion, of the subject 
reflects the conservation of his/her autonomy, so all such behaviors are also 
resources to the hypnotist. With Judy I had the opportunity to learn how being 
challenged is just another variation of the subject's bid for autonomy. She 
asked me what would happen if she tried to "block" the hypnosis. My 
response was that she should try it and see what happens. In this way a 
possible challenge was reframed as something we could explore together, as 
opposed to engaging in a power struggle about it. In the next session we set 
out to explore her "blocking". I started by telling her to think of walking on a 
path in a dark forest. I would alternate this with requests that she should think 
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of her right foot where she is in the room. I continued in this way, switching 
between the imagery of walking in the forest and the sensation in her foot. 
The idea was that she should focus only on my story of the forest and should 
try and "block" my comments about her right foot. As we progressed I 
established a connection between her walking on the path and her right foot. 
The sensation in her foot was equated to the sensation of her right foot 
walking on the path. It became impossible for her to keep the two stories 
separate, yet her ability to move between the two dialogues was reframed as 
a "skill". Her idea of "blocking" was therefore both conserved and perturbed, 
and became an asset to the hypnotic repertoire. 
Using the ordinary to constitute and initiate the hypnotic description 
The hypnotist is a pirate. I make this statement because hypnosis, per se, is 
not a state or entity, as was traditionally thought, and has no "content" - there 
are no "hypnotic" behaviors that we can collect to make up what we 
understand as hypnosis. Hypnosis is a constructed reality that is made up 
from the events, distinctions, behaviors, etc of our everyday world. In setting 
up hypnosis the hypnotist is actively participating in a conversation about 
ideas of hypnosis that will set the rules or agreement of the new description. 
The ideas and mutual behavioral restrictions that emerge from the 
interactions of the participants form the abstract shape of the hypnotic 
description. The body is made up by redefining ordinary events and behaviors 
as hypnotic. As such the hypnotist takes from the natural occurrences of 
everyday life to make up what comes to be known as "trance" and "trance 
behavior". Hypnotic behavior is therefore nothing other than normal, ordinary 
behaviors redefined. 
Looking at the obvious in building up the hypnotic description 
One of the most significant things that my supervisor taught me in defining 
people's behavior as hypnotic, is to look at the obvious. Looking at what is 
right there in front of you - the things you cannot go wrong with. For example, 
the subject is sitting in a chair with his/her eyes closed. Already there is a 
wealth of information to describe and incorporate into the hypnotic 
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description. There is some sensation of the feet touching the ground, of sitting 
on the seat, of his/her arms touching the arm rests. The hypnotist does not 
know what these sensations are, but by bringing them to the attention of the 
subject knows that some perception will be formed of a sensation. Once a 
sensation is defined, the next logical step is deciding if those sensations 
become more or less intense, move or stay where they are. This is a 
beginning point for a multitude of possible distinctions without the risk of being 
"wrong". As such, the hypnotist states the obvious but in doing so includes the 
obvious into the hypnotic description. 
Including all possible variations 
"Suggestions" are tentative distinctions made that the subject can either 
validate or reject. In view of what has been said about the construction of 
descriptions, it may be evident to the_ reader that suggestions can be modified 
to increase the likelihood of them being validated. This is not done by being 
authoritative, but by offering a range of options. When I say to the subject, 
"some people find it more relaxing to close their eyes, although others needn't 
do that to experience the calm of hypnosis" it is not necessary for me to keep 
my fingers crossed that he/she will close his/her eyes. By offering a range of 
possibilities the hypnotist does not set him/herself up for disappointment. At 
the same time, no matter what behavior is selected by the subject (whose 
behaviors are not determined by the hypnotist), the selected behavior has 
been defined as hypnotic. For the constructivist hypnotist there are no 
inherently hypnotic behaviors (this will be discussed in Chapter 4) and hence 
his/her emphasis is on defining any behavior as hypnotic, rather than looking 
for specific behaviors. This makes it easier to construct the hypnotic 
repertoire since the hypnotist does not have ideas about some behaviors not 
being hypnotic. It allows him/her to make use of everything he/she can 
possibly punctuate. 
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Creating an undefined expectation 
Another use of language is making the subject aware of something that is not 
defined. This creates the expectation, yet at the same time leaves it open and 
defines it in a way that, no matter what the person actually experiences, is 
qualified as part of the hypnotic task. Castaneda (1972), in retelling his 
encounters with the shaman Don Juan, gives one such example: 
"Don Juan broke the silence. He said in a whisper that 
we had to act as if nothing was out of the ordinary. I 
asked if there was something in particular that I should 
do. He said that I should get busy writing and do it in 
such a way that it would be as if I were at my desk with 
no worries in the world except writing. At a given moment 
he was going to nudge me and then I should look where 
he was pointing with his eyes. He warned me that no 
matter what I saw I should not utter a single word" 
(p.140). 
This quotation provides the beautiful example of creating an expectation, yet 
not running the risk of specifying ideas. Hence it is easier for the subject to 
establish a functional fit with the description because any response will be 
hypnotic. The quotation shows how Don Juan conserves the subject's 
ordinary behavior by prescribing him to act as if nothing was going on. 
Talking about "more" or "less", rather than "yes" or "no" 
Hypnosis, as a social reality, is constructed in language. The way that 
language is used influences the unfolding of this reality. One aspect of the 
use of language is talking in terms of variation instead of absolute statements. 
For example, if I ask Catherine to tell me about the sensation of warmth in her 
hand that we have established as a replacement for her pain, I ask questions 
like "Is it a warmth that is tolerable?", "Will it become more or less through the 
day?", "Will it stay where it is or move?". These questions invite her to qualify 
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and specify the hypnotic description, yet, in whichever way she qualifies it, it 
will already be part of the hypnotic experience. This type of questioning and 
qualification is not limited to "setting up" the hypnotic reality, but is especially 
useful in giving the hypnotist some leverage in making distinctions that will be 
validated. Our experiences are constantly changing since we perceive 
through difference. The constructivist hypnotist capitalizes on this by 
prescribing this difference or variation. 
Using simple behaviors 
In structuring the hypnotic reality the hypnotist can also make use of simple 
behavioral options, one of which is eye closure. As an inexperienced 
hypnotist, I associated eye closure with one's competence as a hypnotist, 
perhaps because it is often seen as one of the earliest criteria for a light 
trance (Erickson et al, 1990). I was fortunate to have learned not to place 
emphasis on eye closure during inductions, as this is an easy way of setting 
oneself up for pointless power struggles. I nevertheless initially preferred it if 
my subjects closed their eyes, simply because it made me uncomfortable 
when they looked at me. In time, I started to use eye closure and similar 
behaviors in different ways. It is useful to juxtapose certain simple behaviors, 
such as eye closure, with the initiation of the hypnotic description and, later 
on, the validation of the hypnotic description. For example, I told Judy during 
our first session that it is possible to open her eyes when she is hypnotized 
(her eyes were closed). At that stage she couldn't believe it. Some sessions 
later she was able to open her eyes "while hypnotized". This shows how a 
simple behavior that we do hundreds of times per day, can be used to build 
up the hypnotic experience. Hypnosis is the exploitation of the ordinary. 
Incorporating natural behaviors 
People behave within the hypnotic context as they do outside of it. A large 
part of the work of the hypnotist, as has been pointed out, is to use these 
behaviors by defining them as part of the hypnotic process. He/she can 
predict, with fair certainty, that people will find their thoughts wandering and 
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that they will engage in an internal dialogue about whether they are 
hypnotized or not, about what they will do next, about how they are feeling, 
about the fact that their neck is sore. The subject, if not convinced otherwise, 
will use his/her ordinary or habitual description of the world to make sense of 
these experiences. It is therefore essential for the hypnotist to be proactive in 
anticipating these natural behaviors to occur. For example, in working with 
Sharon and Charlene, I can anticipate an internal dialogue that includes 
doubts about the hypnosis. By prescribing those experiences they are 
incorporated and the relational context in which they are embedded is 
changed. By continually making distinctions about these, and other events 
and experiences, the hypnotist ensures that whatever is experienced is 
perceived to be part of the hypnotic domain. In addition, the incorporation of 
different parts of the totality of the person lays the foundation of what will later 
be discussed as extending the hypnotic description to the totality of the 
person. 
Acknowledging environmental disturbances allows us to gain control of our 
experience of them 
Early in my training I was taught that it is more useful to acknowledge 
environmental disturbances when inducing hypnosis than trying to suggest 
that there is, for example, no noise going on next door. In this sense 
Bateson's (1972) comment that we observe by noticing difference is valuable. 
When the noise is no longer something separate from the induction procedure 
we spontaneously cease to perceive it. The attention usually engaged in 
perceiving slight differences and variations around us becomes focused on 
noticing differences related to the hypnotic situation in terms of bodily 
sensations, etc. I found this helpful since my sessions were usually conducted 
in whatever space was available. With Judy, for example, the hypnosis was 
done in the sitting room of a commune that was also a passage to another 
part of the house. Apart from this there were church bells ringing and the 
neighbors' dogs barking, etc in the background. By acknowledging these 
noises and suggesting that it is not necessary to pay attention to them I found 
that they will either be blotted out completely or subjects will report that they 
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experience the noises in a detached manner. We do not determine how the 
person will behave. Setting up hypnosis is, rather, apout the hypnotist 
behaving in a way that makes everything that happens, even the barking of 
the dogs, seem to be part of the hypnosis. This is a much more useful 
approach than trying to find a quiet room in our frantic and noisy world. 
Environmental disturbances are useful in structuring the move into the 
hypnotic description 
As has already been said, acknowledging the obvious makes it part of the 
hypnotic domain in that, for one, the subject need not worry about whether 
he/she can be hypnotized with the noise and whether he/she is supposed to 
hear it at all. By including environmental disturbances in our conversation with 
the subject we define their place, so to speak, and hence it is no longer 
necessary to pay attention to them or attempt to make sense of them in 
relation to the hypnosis. In my own experience I found that these annoying 
environmental disturbances cannot only be modified in terms of their impact 
on the subject, but also be put to good use. In learning to set up the hypnotic 
description the novice hypnotist often finds him/herself at a loss for what 
distinctions to make in initiating the hypnotic description. Environmental 
disturbance often poses an answer and opportunity in that regard. 
An example of the above was with Chris. His apartment was located very 
close to the railway line. At the beginning of one of our sessions it so 
happened that the train was just passing by. Instead of waiting for it to pass I 
asked him to focus on the train and constructed a metaphor of him going into 
a trance as the train passed by. This is what Erickson (Erickson, Rossi & 
Rossi, 1976) referred to as coupling a suggestion with some type of 
inevitability. It was available and seemed a better way to punctuate the 
beginning of the hypnotic description than waiting for it to pass and then using 
some other method. This approach is in line with the thinking that treats not 
only ideas, but also all other behaviors and events, as useful resources. It is 
the hypnotist who has to develop the skill to incorporate these events as they 
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arise, and to do so with grace. Through repeating this process the hypnotic 
description becomes "seamless" and "smooth". 
One environmental disturbance can block out many others 
In some situations there may be more than one environmental disturbance 
present. An example of this was with Andy. We decided to do hypnosis at her 
workplace during her lunch break. Due to this environment there were voices 
in the background, some light traffic, people moving into and out of the room, 
etc. I asked her to become aware of all the sounds and noises and to select 
the one that she thought was most prominent. There was a fan in the 
background that she commented on as being most noticeable. From here I 
used the fan to initiate and expand the hypnotic description. I asked her what 
she noticed about it most and she answered that it was the rhythmical quality 
of its sound. We expanded on this by linking the noise to bodily sensations, 
yet occasionally returning to other sounds and her experience of them. There 
was, however, no intent to block out environmental stimuli. The hypnotist 
focuses on organizing the environment and such organization includes 
determining what is attended to and what not. The environment is rearranged 
according to the logic of the hypnotic description, just as our experience of the 
world is otherwise organized according to the logic of our ordinary 
description. 
Recall of previous hypnosis 
The above discussion has focused on using various attributes of the 
environment and/or subject in constituting and/or initiating the hypnotic 
description. Another way of initiating the hypnotic description, especially with 
subjects who have been hypnotized by the hypnotist before, is the recall of 
such experience. In the act of remembering we organize thoughts (this will be 
discussed in Chapter 4). In this setting that organization is in line with the 
hypnotic description and hence interrupts the ordinary description. To explain, 
it was during a conversation about hypnosis with Ruth and Catherine that we 
were talking about Ruth's previous hypnotic experience in a restaurant. We 
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had produced a very distinct ideosensory experience that included a positive 
visual hallucination. I asked her to recall what she had experienced and to 
describe it in detail. From there I asked her if she was able to feel the same 
sensation when she thought back to it. She could. I proceeded to expand on 
that in generating similar experiences where she moved the sensations to 
different parts of her body and eventually was able to produce limb 
anesthesia. Erickson (Rossi, 1980) also mentions the effectiveness of using 
kinesthetic memories and images as induction techniques. In this example, 
recounting a previous hypnotic experience was a sufficient punctuation to 
define subsequent behaviors as hypnotic. 
Hypnosis in public places 
There is no rule that stipulates that hypnosis should verge on boredom. It was 
from spending a lot of time in restaurants and coffee shops talking about 
hypnosis and having a willing subject that my experimentation in the "public 
domain" began. I initially thought that it would be very difficult because it 
would be challenging to shut out the amount of stimuli around us. To my 
surprise, I discovered that the highly stimulating environment is just as 
effective, if not more so, than the tranquility of the traditional hypnotic setting. 
In the hypnotic situation the hypnotist attempts to define the experience of the 
subject within the hypnotic description. At the same time he/she needs to be 
proactive in anticipating behaviors such as wandering thoughts, being 
distracted, etc. In an extremely stimulating environment such as a restaurant 
or pub a different process takes place. We all know how, when it is so busy, 
we have to concentrate very hard on what the other person is saying to stay 
focused on the conversation. This is exactly what the hypnotist tries to 
achieve - the undivided attention of his/her subject. In a restaurant there is the 
waiter, the music, the people walking by, the curious people in the booth next 
to you, the waiters singing for a child whose birthday it is, a balloon bursting 
next to your ear, etc. In the same way that the environment in a restaurant is 
"happening to you" the stage is set for hypnosis to do the same. The subject 
spontaneously does the work, so to speak, of shutting these stimuli out. At the 
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same time much less attention is available to think of other things. It may also 
be extremely difficult for the subject to make sense of the situation and one 
way of solving the juxtaposition of two conflicting descriptions is to become 
completely absorbed in one. 
Punctuating the boundaries 
Fourie (1988) makes the statement that "[ ... ] a punctuating event is 
necessary. Traditionally, an induction process served as an event which 
carried the connotation for everybody present that subject behaviors following 
on induction would be hypnotic" (p.144 ). Much of the preceding discussion on 
setting up the hypnotic reality has discussed how the hypnotic description is 
co-constructed through various interchanges by which participants conserve 
their autonomy. Yet in most cases a punctuating event is necessary. This 
does not mean that any of the above descriptions and processes are not 
punctuating events. What is necessary is that a line be drawn in the sand, so 
to speak, where the subject can know that at such and such a point "I am 
hypnotized", which means, "now I conserve myself with the hypnotic 
description". In a similar fashion Castaneda (1983, 1998) speaks about using 
physical contact, such as a slap on the back, to signify the shift into another 
description of the world. Such an event or cue is in itself meaningless and 
powerless apart from the meaning ascribed to it as signifying a change of 
description. Hence closing the eyes, or sitting down, or concentrating on a 
specific sensation may all serve as such punctuations. This consensually 
clarifies the description of the world that is in effect. 
Such punctuating events define the boundaries, signifying when the hypnotic 
description begins, as well as when and where it ends. This makes it clear at 
what point in time the subject is no longer hypnotized, or when the hypnotic 
description is no longer in effect. Such punctuations usually involve a complex 
combination of tone, posture, language, eye contact, etc on the part of all 
participants. These are all linguistic behaviors by which we tell each other, 
without necessarily using words, that we agree that we have reverted to the 
ordinary description. Hence the hypnotist may count to five for the subject in 
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"coming out of the trance" and then at five asks the subject to open his/her 
eyes. At five the subject may open his/her eyes, sit upright in the chair again, 
etc. These are consensual linguistic interchanges by which we punctuate 
boundaries and establish and validate either the ordinary or the hypnotic 
description. 
Moving towards engagement of totality of the person 
Setting up the hypnotic reality has as its focus punctuating the context as 
hypnotic, co-creating the boundaries of the hypnotic description, disrupting 
habitual descriptions of behavior, and replacing these descriptions with 
hypnotic descriptions. In the chapters to follow the emphasis will be on 
expanding the hypnotic repertoire and gradually moving towards coherence. 
An important feature of both these processes will be the engagement of the 
totality of the person. This means that hypnosis is not only experienced in 
dialogue and words, but also established as a physical and emotional reality. 
Although this chapter does not focus on this process of moving towards 
engaging the totality of the person, there are many ways in which the 
foundation can be laid. In doing so the hypnotic description is rooted, so to 
speak, from the start as an all-encompassing reality. Along with establishing 
the hypnotic description as combined physical, emotional, and languaged 
reality, is the facilitation of active participation on the part of the subject. It is 
my experience that the more active the subject is in the beginning stages of 
hypnosis, the more flexible he/she becomes in initiating and validating the 
hypnotic description in diverse settings. The implications for practice are to 
structure one's own activity to allow enough room for the subject to take the 
initiative. A few examples of the above two processes are discussed. 
Physical manipulation 
A large part of the hypnotic description is built up through language between 
the participants. In the same way, if the specific relationship allows, the body 
of the subject can be physically sculpted. This can be explained with 
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reference to hypnosis with Maggie. At the beginning of the hypnosis I noticed 
her potentially uncomfortable posture. However, instead of just commenting 
on it in one way or another, I proceeded to sculpt her body into a more 
comfortable position by moving her arms into a position that would allow for 
better circulation. At the same time I was giving suggestions about this being 
a more relaxing position, etc. This proved to be a useful behavior on my part 
since she reported it being a positive experience. Furthermore the act of 
being moved is involuntary in a much more pronounced way. Instead of 
indirectly speculating about her comfort, I was making her comfortable. There 
is much less room for uncertainty, and sensations of relaxation are directly 
linked to bodily sensations. 
Using emotions 
The hypnotic description is not restricted to language and ideas. It involves 
the totality of our being. And it does so even if we sit still throughout the 
hypnotic session. Our bodies and emotions are just as useful resources as 
are our ideas and visualizations. What is more, as has been discussed in 
Chapter 2, our emotions form part of an interconnected unit. This means that 
a shift in any part of the unit, our totality, will affect the rest. Just as the idea of 
lightness or warmth in my hand can lead to the actual physical sensation, so 
also may my experience of being frightened or sad be valuable in leading to 
different perceptions. Castaneda (1968) makes the bold statement that "there 
is nothing wrong with being afraid. When you fear, you see things in a 
different way" (p.49). This became very evident in my first session with 
Catherine. 
I made use of guided imagery in setting up the hypnotic description. She had 
the idea that it is not possible to speak while hypnotized. She became scared 
by the imagery used but was unable to speak or open her eyes. It was from 
her facial expressions that I could detect that something was amiss and 
hence drew a punctuation to end the hypnosis. This experience made me 
realize that there are many emotions relating to hypnosis that may be used in 
bringing about changes in description. Castaneda (1974) describes the 
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teachings of Don Juan as emphasizing that our specific view of the world is 
kept in place by certain emotions. In his tasks Don Juan would often bring 
about shifts of perception by setting up the context for Castaneda to 
experience emotions of fear, confusion, etc. We conserve our autonomy not 
only through ideas and behaviors, but through our emotioning as well. 
Our emotions can be understood as cues or markers therein that they select 
the types of discourses we engage in. Maturana (1988) states that our 
emotions determine the domain in which our rational arguments take place. 
The way we reason or make sense of the world is hence selected partially by 
. our emotions. Certain actions and distinctions are more likely to occur when 
we are experiencing a specific emotion. Emotions are functional and act not 
only to select the description used, but also to keep that description in place. 
It may therefore be of value to facilitate a specific emotion in shifting a set of 
physiological experiences or thoughts. 
The use of complex practical tasks and rituals 
"The manoeuvre of altering the context of my ordinary 
world by taking me for hikes and hunting was another 
instance of his system that had bypassed me. Context 
disarrangement meant that I did not know the ropes and 
my attention had to be focused on everything don Juan 
did" (Castaneda, 197 4, p.233). 
Many small ways of shifting attention and drawing hypnotic distinctions have 
been described. In this section the focus was briefly on the body and 
emotions as forming part of our totality and being equally useful in shifting our 
description of the world. In setting up hypnotic descriptions involving the 
totality of the person, the use of complex practical tasks and rituals seems 
most effective. They not only require consensus and description in language, 
but enactment and, due to the novel and unfamiliar nature thereof, often also 
emotions like fear and anxiety. 
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Sybil was a student nurse whom I briefly met during my internship. Through 
our conversation we spoke about hypnosis and she volunteered to be 
hypnotized. Prior to the hypnosis Sybil, her friend, two psychology interns and 
myself were engaged in an informal conversation. When hypnosis as topic 
was raised I suggested that we do the hypnosis right there. She had been 
slightly apprehensive and I consequently suggested that her friend, as well as 
the rest of the people in the room, stay to witness. I arranged everyone in a 
half circle with her chair slightly removed. I presented her with a detailed 
sequence of actions that she had to perform, moving from one person to the 
next, feeling their left hand with her right hand and paying attention to the 
sensation when doing so. When she had completed this task with everyone, 
she was to sit down in the chair allocated to her and go into a trance. All of 
this she did. 
This ritual, if one can call it such, was the first thing that came up in my mind. 
My aim was to involve Sybil's totality in setting up the hypnotic description, 
capturing her attention and not allowing the opportunity for using her habitual 
description of the world. This meant she had to perform a complex set of 
tasks that required her moving around and interacting with people whose very 
presence qualified what she was doing as hypnosis. The idea of this 
elaborate sequence as not being hypnosis was not created in any way. 
Don Juan makes the statement that "ritual can trap our attention better than 
anything" (Castaneda, 1983, p.204 ). He also teaches the usefulness of 
"uncommon, elaborate tactics that require [ ... ] discipline and concentration" 
(Castaneda, 1984, p.66). By devising inherently meaningless and even 
absurd practical tasks and rituals we can effectively disrupt the subject's 
habitual description. At the same time we engage him/her on a level of 
thought, language, movement and emotions. The above example shows my 
initial attempt at using ritual in shifting the pervading description of the 
context. Elaborate tactics capture the attention of the person and engage 
him/her in a series of behaviors that, apart from engaging his/her totality, are 
completely described within the hypnotic description. This type of experience 
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builds up the hypnotic description as a veritable reality or domain of 
experience. 
Modifying the behavior of the hypnotist 
Most of what has been described concerns ways in which the hypnotist 
facilitates certain contexts by changing or modifying his/her own behavior. 
This is what this dissertation is concerned with. Such modifications vary in the 
extent to which they are embodied by the totality of the hypnotist. Sometimes 
he/she may make use of facial expressions, posture, tone of voice, speed of 
speech, eye contact, etc. Sometimes he/she may sit upright, leaning slightly 
forward while within the hypnotic description, and then punctuate the ordinary 
description by leaning back and using a more casual tone of voice. Such 
modifications serve both as continual cues and punctuations - modifications 
to which the subject becomes just as sensitive as the hypnotist to the 
subject's slowing of speech and sinking into the chair. As has been described 
in Chapter 2, these are linguistic behaviors by which participants coordinate 
each others' and their own behaviors. 
Another useful punctuation in using the hypnotist's behavior is removing the 
hypnotist from the situation temporarily. Margaret and myself had had a few 
sessions previously and she had been asking for another on more than one 
occasion. This prolonged expectancy proved useful in that when the 
opportunity arose (which was in a restaurant) the implicit meaning was that if 
we didn't do it then, we probably wouldn't get around to it. The "induction" 
entailed that I needed to go to the bathroom and used that as punctuation. I 
got up telling her that, by the time I got back, she should be in a trance. No 
other instructions were given to her or to the observer that was present. After 
a few minutes I was back and she exclaimed that she was in a trance even 
before I disappeared around the corner. I did not express doubt or question 
her about what she did, but immediately started talking to her as if she was 
hypnotized. From her side she was more passive, receptive and drowsy: her 
way of defining what was happening as hypnosis. 
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Using observers to qualify subject behaviors as hypnotic 
Ir my work with many of my subjects I made use of observers. The example 
with Sybil was just mentioned. Observers are not passive but actively 
participate in punctuating events and behaviors as hypnotic. Hence, when the 
observers said nothing and watched silently the antics performed by Sybil, 
they were qualifying that what was taking place was hypnosis. They did not, 
for example, engage Sybil in conversation, nor did they talk to each other 
except by glances. Observers are a powerful resource and can be used in 
many ways. With Charlene I engaged an observer in conversations about 
what was taking place, thereby offering not only descriptions that defined her 
behavior as hypnotic, but also using an observer to validate my descriptions. 
We all know how difficult it is to extricate ourselves from ideas about our 
behaviors once they are shared between people. The easiest way to deal with 
this situation is often to accept it. This is what the hypnotist attempts to 
facilitate. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described how hypnosis is co-constructed by 
participants in language and other linguistic behaviors. The constructivist 
hypnotist was described as someone who considers how to incorporate all 
behaviors and environmental events into the hypnotic description. In doing so 
he/she validates the subject's conservation of his/her autonomy in being able 
to specify his/her own behavior. In setting up the hypnotic description the 
hypnotist describes this new description to the subject. It is new and 
unfamiliar to the subject, and the subject is not yet invested in it. The 
hypnotist uses tactics to capture the attention of the subject and present the 
new description by making the subject aware of unusual parts of his/her 
ordinary experience. He/she redefines all these experiences as hypnotic. 
Although hypnosis starts with ideas and language, the hypnotist actively 
works towards incorporating the totality of the person. 
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In the next chapter the ideas presented here will be continued, although there 
will be a shift in emphasis. The same processes are involved in expanding the 
hypnotic reality and the reader will find many similarities. Whereas this 
chapter discussed the actions and distinctions required to establish a new 
description, the next chapter focuses on behaviors that provide the subject 
with the opportunity to validate the hypnotic description. At the same time a 
repertoire of behaviors is developed that are defined as hypnotic. These 




EXPANDING THE HYPNOTIC REALITY 
"He [Don Juan] pointed out that everyone who comes 
into contact with a child is a teacher who incessantly 
describes the world to him, until the moment when the 
child is capable of perceiving the world as it is 
described. [ ... ] From that moment on, however, the 
child is a member. He knows the description of the 
world; and his membership becomes full-fledged [ ... ] 
when he is capable of making all the proper perceptual 
interpretations which, by conforming to that description, 
validate it" (Castaneda, 1972, p.8-9, author's emphasis, 
italics in original). 
In the previous chapter the process by which the hypnotist "incessantly 
.. describes" the hypnotic description to the subject was presented. The 
emphasis was on setting up this description. This was done through 
establishing a consensual conversational domain in which ideas about 
hypnosis were exchanged. This exchange lead to a co-constructed definition 
that was functional in coordinating, but also restricting, the further actions and 
distinctions of participants. Emphasis was placed on the behavior of the 
hypnotist. The hypnotist operates from the epistemological foundation that 
behavior is structurally determined and hence knows that all he/she can do, is 
to change his/her own behavior. In setting up the hypnotic description the 
hypnotist uses his/her own distinctions in redefining the subject's behaviors, 
environmental events, and all other contextual givens as hypnotic. This 
chapter is not separate from the above and should be understood as a 
continuation of the same principles. What should be evident is a shift of 
emphasis from defining to expanding the hypnotic description. The hypnotic 
description is expanded by developing a set of behaviors mutually defined as 




In setting up the hypnotic reality a domain of knowing, or description, is 
delineated. The starting point for this is creating a consensual conversational 
domain that is characterized by being grounded in verbal and linguistic co-
ordinations. This sets up hypnosis as a languaged reality, but is not enough to 
make it a domain where participants can conserve the totality of themselves. 
It does not yet simulate our everyday experiential world in terms of the extent 
of its involvement of our thoughts, feelings, sensations, movement and 
interactional sequences. In other words, it is not "big enough" for us to 
conserve ourselves within. Expanding the hypnotic domain is about "filling it 
out" in terms of the components of our everyday experience. Initially the 
hypnotic domain consists of ideas, verbal exchanges, and some rudimentary 
bodily sensations. As it develops, it expands in terms of the extent and 
inclusiveness of the parts of our total experience of being in the world. 
Everything that we do can be understood as the active conservation of our 
autonomy. As the hypnotic domain expands as part of a consensual dialogue 
between subject and hypnotist, it becomes a domain in which both are 
autopoietically invested. This investment lies therein that the hypnotic domain 
actively realizes the autopoiesis of the participants. The more extensive the 
hypnotic domain becomes in terms of its involvement of the totality of the 
participants, the more invested they will be in it. The hypnotic encounter can 
therefore be understood as a world within which the subject can conserve 
certain ideas, thoughts, emotions, actions, dreams, aspirations, etc that in 
turn conserve his/her identity. Hypnosis as such has the potential of being a 
domain for self-realization. The constructivist hypnotist works towards making 
it an all-inclusive domain of experience that will facilitate this process. This is 
done by developing a range of behaviors defined as hypnotic, or the hypnotic 
repertoire. 
By developing a hypnotic repertoire, and every repertoire will be unique, the 
actions and interactions that are to take place within the hypnotic domain are 
defined. As such, a set of actions and distinctions, on the part of both the 
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hypnotist and subject, organizes the hypnotic encounter in prescribing the 
type of changes each is to undergo in relation to the other. This set of 
changes is the hypnotic repertoire. The hypnotic repertoire not only defines 
and restricts the structural changes each may undergo during hypnosis, but 
also the changes they may undergo in relation to the changes of the other. An 
apt metaphor to describe the above may be to compare the development of 
the hypnotic repertoire to learning a dance. It is not only about learning and 
mastering a specific range of moves and turns, but more importantly, learning 
and mastering these moves in relation to the moves and turns of the other. 
Hypnotic behavior, in order to become an option for enactment, needs to be 
familiar. In continuation of the metaphor of dancing it can therefore be said, 
that when the dancers have experiential familiarity and confidence with 
dancing, the chances of them engaging spontaneously in it is increased. 
Applied to hypnosis this means that the subject needs to become familiar with 
being within the hypnotic description. This familiarity is established by 
expanding the hypnotic repertoire and continually engaging the subject in 
participating in it. Through repeated experience the subject learns the new 
description. The hypnotic repertoire can therefore be understood as a set of 
behaviors within a different (hypnotic) cognitive domain. Through constant 
engagement of the behaviors that constitute this, the subject becomes 
confident in organizing his/her world by using the cognitive principles of the 
hypnotic domain. 
This chapter presents the expansion of the hypnotic domain in two parts. The 
first considers some examples of hypnotic behaviors, including analgesia, 
anaesthesia, hallucinations, amnesia, etc. These are all specific behaviors by 
which the hypnotic domain is filled out. These behaviors are also more 
traditional hypnotic behaviors. The second part of the chapter presents 
examples of hypnotic dialogues. The examples presented here can more 
accurately be referred to as generic processes of interaction within the 
hypnotic description, rather than being specific behaviors. 
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Examples of hypnotic behaviors 
So far, repeated reference has been made to developing a hypnotic 
repertoire. What has not been said, however, is what makes a behavior 
hypnotic and hence part of this repertoire. A behavior is hypnotic when it is 
consensually described or defined as such. There is nothing inherently 
hypnotic in behaviors such as anaesthesia, analgesia, hallucinations and 
amnesia, except that they may be described as such. This description or 
attribution of meaning may be either verbal, linguistic, contextual, or most 
likely, a combination of all three. Hence the same behavior will not be 
hypnotic in a different context or when it is defined in a different way. 
Sensory alterations 
Expanding the hypnotic repertoire is about establishing a set of behaviors and 
experiences that are defined as hypnotic. These behaviors and experiences 
are obtained by the vigilance of the hypnotist in looking for ordinary everyday 
events, usually ones that are not attended to or are disregarded, and then 
redefining their occurrence as hypnotic. An example of this is eye closure that 
was discussed in Chapter 3. A simple action is redefined not only to become 
the punctuating or transitional event for a different cognitive domain (the 
hypnotic description), but also defined as a significant behavioral 
accomplishment. The hypnotist finds an arbitrary sensory event as a starting 
point, and from there expands the experience in juxtaposition with the 
hypnotic definition. Hence, closing the eyes is taken as a starting point and all 
consequent behaviors, generalized from the eyes to the rest of the body, are 
observations that are "explained" by using the hypnotic description. It may be 
clear now why our explanations for the things that happen to us in everyday 
life have nothing to do with finding causal links and everything with organizing 
our participation in the world. 
The above process can be explained with reference to my work with Candice. 
Starting our session I would ask her to lift both her arms quickly, put them 
down, and then establish which one is heavier. Typically the subject will point 
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out one of his/her arms, which is also what Candice did. Once this sensation 
has been established further alterations, such as increasing, decreasing, 
shifting and transforming this experience, can be introduced. It will be clear to 
the reader that there is nothing inherently hypnotic in either lifting one's arms 
or experiencing a difference in their weight. Yet what is elicited is an unusual 
behavior in an unusual context. A small validation that one arm is heavier or 
lighter than the other validates the hypnotic logic or way of thinking. It is 
furthermore set up as an "objective observation" - the subject merely has to 
notice something, as opposed to an overt request for a specific behavior 
being made. The way the hypnotist presents these experiences and 
definitions to the subject, as described in Chapter 3, is to minimize possible 
disqualification and maximize the opportunity for the subject to contribute in 
his/her idiosyncratic way. 
Our experience of our bodies and the world continually changes. The 
hypnotist capitalizes on this by defining a natural change or variation as being 
hypnotic. The subject contributes in the process by validating this definition. In 
my work with Peggy it was her experience of her breathing that was linked to 
the experience of heaviness. All that the hypnotist is trying to achieve is the 
proverbial foot in the door - a validation of a definition. In this case, that 
validation will be Peggy nodding in agreement that she feels heavier every 
time she exhales. It will make sense to say that what is unusual about 
hypnosis is not what is described, but rather that it is described and how it is 
described. 
Fourie (1990) comments on how a behavior such as hand levitation is often 
qualified as hypnotic behavior even though there is nothing inherently 
hypnotic about it. It is interesting, however, to observe how something so 
trivial can be imbued with so much attention as to become something out of 
the ordinary. This is, once again, a simplistic ideosensory behavior that is 
developed and can be ideal in punctuating the hypnotic description or forming 
the basis for further developments. Simple behaviors are used to establish an 
embodied idea. Once the idea is consensually validated, it allows for further, 
more complex ideas to become embodied. 
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Analgesia 
Analgesia, or the relief of pain, can only be understood in terms of pain and 
how pain is defined. Pain is not an objective experience. The needle does not 
cause the pain, nor is the actual burn wound the only aspect of the patient's 
suffering. Pain is an embodied idea. It is embedded in a matrix of meanings, 
attributions, emotions, relationships, etc and does not exist independently of 
what we say or think about it. Pain reflects how our bodies re-organize our 
participation in, and interaction with, the world. It does so because that is the 
only viable structural change at the time. However, just as lifting our arms 
carries with it the potential of being redefined as heavy, so the organization of 
our experience in relation to some bodily event has the potential for variation. 
In other words, pain, and the way in which it is experienced cognitively, is just 
one of many possible experiences. 
The first example of the above process comes from my work with Catherine. 
She had been suffering from severe headaches for many years and, to a 
large extent, had become dependent on daily doses of relatively strong 
analgesics. The aim of the hypnosis was the relief of a specific headache. 
Pain, like many other experiences, is largely nonverbal, undifferentiated and 
generalized. The first step is therefore to bring it into language through a 
conversation that specifies the exact location and sensation of the pain. This 
is already a reorganization of the experience and consequently of the 
behaviors that flow from it. The second step is to introduce the idea, but not 
the intention, of mastering the pain. In this regard I would make comments to 
Catherine about the possibility, that even as we spoke, the pain may undergo 
changes. This introduces the idea that change may occur, but disrupts our 
ordinary notion that we have to or should control it. From here we could 
explore how the pain may become a little bit more intense. This is paradoxical 
since it contradicts the assumed intention of alleviating the pain. It is 
functional, however, since it introduces the idea of change and, once the idea 
of change for the worse is established, the idea of change for the better is the 
logical complementary behavior. 
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Two further processes in the transformation of the pain experience can be 
explained with reference to a later session with Catherine. In this session 
Catherine had a complaint of pain in her joints due to her osteoporosis. We 
made use of guided imagery in creating a distinct visual representation of the 
pain. This is a further step in making pain more specific, in this instance by 
making it visual. The idea of change that had been established was extended 
to include control at the desire or will of the subject. Hence she could allow 
her visual representation (a ball) of the pain to change in terms of its size. The 
newly created visualization of the pain was expanded to include a sense of 
warmth, and with the idea of warmth was introduced the idea of it being 
tolerable. Catherine left the session with a sense of warmth that replaced the 
previous pain experience. She was able to notice how the warmth gradually 
faded towards the end of the day. 
In the above example the hypnotic description became an alternative to 
Catherine for organizing her experience. The experience of warmth that was 
pleasant, localized and controllable replaced generalized discomfort and pain. 
Prior to the above session Catherine had walked with marked difficulty due to 
the pain in her joints. Although no mention was made of walking with greater 
ease, I noticed afterwards how she walked with more ease and vigor. We 
experience the world with our totality, and we embody this totality. Catherine 
is an example of how a change in the Wf3Y she languaged her experience 
affected the rest of her embodiment. 
In my very limited work with patients suffering from burn injuries, I had the 
opportunity to make use of analgesia with subjects who were in constant pain. 
An example of this was with Olivia. She had burn wounds over a large part of 
her body and refused to allow nursing staff to change her dressing and clean 
her wounds, a procedure that caused her excruciating pain. We only had one 
session, yet she proved to respond extremely well. The interaction with her 
taught me the practical implications of ourr organization of our experience in 
time and how time can be used to introduce variation in experience. Our 
conversation started with the details of the pain she was experiencing at 
I 
present. I then asked her how much worse the pain was when she had just 
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arrived in hospital. She stated that it was much worse when she first arrived. I 
also offered the idea that the pain became less intense when she thought of 
her son, who she missed while in hospital. We proceeded in this way, 
speaking about the difference in pain between the first week and the second 
week, this week and last week, the beginning of this week and now, 
yesterday and today, this morning and now, a few minutes ago and now. In 
this way, the difference of experience~ over time was used to create an 
experiential reality that the pain was becoming more tolerable from one 
moment to another. She was able to .validate that, even while we were 
speaking, she felt less pain than she did before we started. Unfortunately we 
could not continue with this work. It shows, however, how remarkable our 
perception is when mobilized. Just as we organize time and our existence 
within it to feel pain, we can also learn to do the opposite. 
Limb anaesthesia 
When we wake up after having slept on our side and are unable to feel 
anything in our arm, we do not see it as unusual. Our bodies know how not to 
feel just as well as they know how to feel. We just never think of our 
experiences in such a way. The ability not to feel our leg, for example, has 
nothing to do with hypnosis. It is a structural ability that we have. It is a 
behavior, and the art of the hypnotist is to find the context of ideas and 
experiences that will allow such a behavior to be performed. This was done 
with Ruth. We made use of her recall of a previous hypnotic experience 
where she had a significant sensation of lightness to initiate the hypnotic 
description. This recalled feeling of lightness was transformed in this session 
into a feeling of heaviness that was described as a dull feeling. Continuing 
descriptions building on the preceding defined the experience in her leg as a 
lack of sensation and control. When asked to walk, she walked with difficulty 
due to the decreased sensation in her leg. She reported that it felt as if her leg 
was "asleep". In developing this type of hypnotic behavior, the hypnotist is like 
a choreographer who facilitates the dance of perception to unfold. What is 
experienced is determined completely by the structure of the subject, yet the 
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hypnotist, like a good salesperson, increases the likelihood of some 
experiences being selected above others. 
Visual hallucinations 
The hypnotic description brings the attention of the subject to unusual aspects 
of experience. These aspects are not externally imposed but are structural 
changes that are already within the repertoire of the subject. In Chapter 2, it 
was said that what we perceive as objects are also descriptions or obscured 
linguistic behaviors. With this in mind it makes sense that it is possible to 
"see" things that are not there, in other words, to describe objects that do not 
exist in the ordinary description of the world. This is not as unusual as it 
seems. Have we not all experienced someone calling our name when no one 
did? Or were convinced that we saw something in a specific place that turned 
out to be in another place? Or felt something crawling on our head when we 
heard people talking about head lice? We have ways of disqualifying these 
experiences, yet they are real. And the hypnotic description builds on this 
"realness" that always seems to border on our ordinary description. 
Ruth provided an opportunity to develop a visual hallucination in accordance 
with the above. We had been exploring her ability to alter at will a sensation 
that had started off as the experience of difference in the weight of her arms. 
She was able to consciously move the experience to different parts of her 
body. At the same time she could change the sensory modality through which 
she was experiencing it until she could see a transparent purple ball resting 
on her hand. 
Time distortion 
Time is relative. Yes, one can discuss all sorts of theories about time and our 
experience of it, but on a day-to-day basis we all have the tacit knowledge 
that time is a relative experience. We may be watching a good movie and it 
seems unbelievable, that when the credits start rolling, two hours have 
passed. We start daydreaming while driving somewhere and miss an exit 
because we did not realize we had traveled so far (and so long) already. Yet 
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these experiences of time-distortion are not typically considered trance or 
hypnotic phenomena. We punctuate them as a part of life. The hypnotist, on 
the other hand, punctuates these as hypnotic phenomena. Not because they 
are, but because they lend themselves to it. In this way a part of everyday life 
becomes a hypnotic behavior. A completely ordinary occurrence becomes the 
achievement of the subject. In this way, as in the other redefinitions of 
behaviors described here, the hypnotist is active in expanding the hypnotic 
repertoire by including through redefinition the ignored, ordinary and 
undifferentiated parts of our everyday experience. 
A more specific example of time distortion came from my hypnosis with Chris. 
During one of our sessions at Chris's home there was the sound of a garden 
sprinkler in the background. I noticed a change in the sound it was making 
and, as was my habit, included it in my description of his possible sensory 
experiences. After the session he commented with amazement that he did not 
know how I was able to predict the change. His report of the sequence of 
events stated that I made the suggestion and that the sound only changed 
afterwards. He had distorted the sequence of events. This not only qualified 
the process as hypnosis (because this was not possible otherwise), but also 
attributed to me the power to alter his sensory experiences. We organize 
time, not the other way around. Knowing (or assuming) this opens up a 
valuable resource to the hypnotist. 
Amnesia and recall 
It was said in the above section that we organize our experience of time. This, 
along with memories, is a powerful part of how we conserve ourselves. 
Memories, as a combination of "assumed facts" and time, are powerful tools 
in conserving our identity. Both are relative, but we live as if they are cast in 
stone. Castaneda ( 197 4) writes about the importance of our memories in 
keeping our ordinary description of the world intact, and hence highlights the 
functionality, as opposed to the factuality, of our memories. We specify our 
behavior, and our memories are nor excluded from that. In this light it is not in 
any way unusual that someone may be able to recover lost memories. Such 
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recovery can perhaps be understood more accurately as a reorganization that 
serves a different purpose in terms of the subject's identity and adaptation. 
One part of this reorganization may be that the person can conserve the idea 
of themselves as competent hypnotic subjects. When the context within which 
our ideas and experiences are edited is changed, the logical consequence 
will be that our recall will also change. 
My hypnosis with Judy started around the theme of recovering a lost family 
heirloom. Although we were not able to recover the lost object (partly because 
we both became more interested in exploring hypnosis per se), she was able 
to recover memories of the day she lost the object. She was able to recollect 
the specific effect the sun made as it was shining through the trees, as well as 
her bodily experience of it. She reported this to be an unusual experience 
because she felt like she was at the same place again, going through the 
same experience. 
On another occasion in my work with both Catherine and Candice, I made 
use of the suggestion that they may find, at the end of the session, that there 
are parts of the experience that they would not be able to remember. In our 
daily activities we are always forgetting little details. Most of us definitely do 
not have verbatim recall of most (if any) of our conversations with others. Yet 
we never seem to think of describing this experience as amnesia. However, in 
broadening the hypnotic repertoire, these experiences provide the hypnotist 
with yet another opportunity to introduce and/or expand the hypnotic 
description. 
Following from the above the implication is that the way we organize our 
memories has nothing to do with being factual. It is functional. In a similar way 
Fourie (1998b) illustrates how the "false memory of molestation" (p. 537) may 
be functional or useful. The constructivist hypnotist is always aware that every 
behavior, including our memories and experience of time, is subservient to 
our conservation of our identity and adaptation. 
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Examples of hypnotic dialogues 
The following section presents processes of engaging the subject in the 
hypnotic description where the aim is not to elicit specific behaviors. The 
focus is on creating a conversation that disrupts the ordinary description of 
the world by drawing on the hypnotic logic. Such dialogues are fluid since the 
end result is not predetermined as some specific behavior. It requires more 
on the part of the hypnotist in terms of flexibility and continual adjustment to 
the autonomous behaviors of the subject. In my experience, developing these 
dialogues is more effective in establishing a unique fit with the subject, and 
also allows for filling the hypnotic space in a much more natural manner. 
Parallel activity 
I started my work with Lindy by asking her to write a list of words. This was a 
random activity. I would use the content of her lists to construct a theme and 
would ask her to make another list of words relating to the theme. I then 
commented on the connection between the content of her lists and her 
physical experience. I also commented on the change in her physical 
experience over the course of making the different lists. I then asked her to 
make a story, using some of the words from one of her lists that had been 
defined as having a pleasant emotional connotation. As she was 
concentrating on making up the story, I asked her to place her hands on the 
table, lift them, and comment on the difference she experienced. Throughout 
the session we would alternate between what she was experiencing in her 
limbs and the story, about which I would ask her extensive questions to help 
her elaborate. For a significant part of the session I kept the story and bodily 
experience separate. Then, as in the case with Judy discussed earlier, I 
moved towards establishing a link between what was happening in her body 
and with her story. Her responses to questions and suggestions relating to 
her body became more rapid and compliant and she could produce some 
significant sensory experiences. This is the same process that was described 
in Chapter 3 with Judy. Using a parallel process captures the subject's 
attention without allowing them to predict the outcome in any way. No matter 
62 
what part of the process he/she responds to, his/her behavior is eventually 
defined as hypnotic. 
Enactment of scenarios 
Our bodyhood is a powerful tool in keeping our perceptions in place, and 
perhaps that is why it is always the same people volunteering for roleplays at 
workshops, and the same ones looking at the carpet instead. Apart from 
being an extremely valuable therapeutic tool, the use of the body is valuable 
in shifting perceptions. It is also useful with someone who is not comfortable 
with the idea of having unusual experiences. With Charlene I made use of the 
enactment of short scenarios as hypnotic behavior. I would start speaking to 
her without warning saying "Quick, there is someone at the door, go ... yes, go, 
go open it. I think it is a package, what's in it?". She proceeded to participate 
while I watched and gave a few prompts, at the same time making comments 
about her appearance to an observer. What was a quiet hypnotic session a 
minute ago became a stage with drama. She was able to enact and respond 
to cues for her contribution, as well as to make spontaneous additions. It was 
also possible to make distinctions since her embodiment was so visibly 
different from what it usually was, something she could comment on 
afterwards. 
Chapter 3 introduced the use of rituals in setting up the hypnotic reality. 
Providing different scenarios serves to trap the attention of the subject. It also 
engages him/her more completely, triggering many experiences that are 
related to the body in movement. The bodyhood and emoting of someone 
enacting a scenario undergoes a significant shift and one much more 
noticeable than had he/she remained in his/her seat with hands clasped. If we 
are trying to expand the hypnotic idea into a full-fledged reality we have to 
remember that our ordinary lives do not happen while we sit passively with 
our eyes closed in a chair. Our everyday reality involves our totality, as has 
been pointed out. Although I by no means want to criticize a more passive 
approach to hypnosis, my personal interest is in developing more 
encompassing descriptions. To find ways of establishing such complex 
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descriptions I take our everyday experience in the world as a good starting 
point. 
Facilitating certain emotions 
It follows from the above that manipulating the subject's body shifts his/her 
way of describing what is going on. An area that is often not spoken about is 
the wide range of emotions experienced by the subject. It has been said in 
Chapter 3 that the subject comes to hypnosis with feelings ranging from fear 
and nervousness to excitement, and these offer themselves as useful tools. In 
starting out with hypnosis I recall one or two sessions where the subject 
would start to giggle or laugh. This was an ideal opportunity for defining such 
behavior as typical hypnotic behavior. Hence I could say to the subject that 
he/she shouldn't worry about laughing since laughter is one way of allowing 
oneself to feel the looseness and relaxed atmosphere of hypnosis. This was 
usually an effective way of not only dealing with a wider range of emotions 
and affect, but also of being responsive to the person's bid for autonomy. Any 
behavior can be defined as hypnotic. It is just not always easy for the 
hypnotist to adjust his/her behaviors at the drop of a hat. 
Telling a story and magical solutions 
In my work with Christi I had told her a story about an old witch with all sorts 
of powers. The story trapped her attention and she was absolutely amazed by 
it. It became something that we shared - something she believed in. Some 
months later (although there had been a few other references to the witch) 
Christi had an earache that I had reason to believe was psychosomatic, given 
her history. I told her that the old witch had once told me that for an earache 
you should put your finger in the opposite ear and hold it there for five 
minutes. Initially I had just told her to put her finger in her ear, but this she 
could not accept. When I made reference to the witch, she complied and the 
pain was gone within a few minutes. As such, the story became a resource -
the creation of a fictional character that, even though told by me, gave 
whatever I said "as coming from the witch" more acceptability. 
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Shifting the behavior of the hypnotist into the absurd 
In our interactions with each other we enact little dramas that are all too 
familiar and of which we all know the endings. Yet there are moments when 
we are caught by surprise. In my work with Christi there was an incident 
where she was very upset, climbing onto and walking on furniture and 
threatening people. The typical scenario would be that everyone, including 
myself, would attempt to de-escalate her behavior by talking to her. However, 
on this occasion I walked towards her and suddenly started walking slowly, 
like someone would do in a film that is played in slow motion. I came closer to 
her and eventually stopped, the movement of my arms transforming to 
become the branches of a tree swaying in the wind. In short, my behavior 
shifted from the predictable into the absurd and unexpected. Christi stopped 
her behavior the moment she realized what I was doing. Where she had been 
crying and assaultive, she started laughing, jumped into my arms, and 
allowed herself to be nurtured. 
Punctuating a period of time 
I have described how the hypnotist is always looking for behaviors or events 
that can be defined as hypnotic. However, this is sometimes easier said than 
done, especially if you are an inexperienced hypnotist and unaccustomed to 
making distinctions around subtle variations. Punctuating and describing a 
period of time that has elapsed as hypnotic is often useful. It is much more 
vague, but for the same reason, much more difficult to disqualify. An example 
of this comes from my hypnosis with Charlene. Initially she was very 
uncomfortable in executing tasks that involved movement and was clearly 
somewhat uncomfortable with her body. After she had performed some 
enactments it was evident that she was more spontaneous and fluid in her 
movements. I proceeded to punctuate a period of time in which her behavior 
had different qualities. She validated this and thereby also validated being 
hypnotized during that time. This allowed me to define her behavior as 
hypnotic without really having to define any specific action as hypnotic. 
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Creating a time-line of change 
Earlier in this chapter a session with Olivia was described. The change in 
perception achieved was through a process of creating a time-line of change. 
This process makes use of the subject's memory and the fact that all 
experiences constantly change. In the session I started off by comparing her 
experience of pain a few weeks ago, her experience now, and how her 
experience will be different in a few weeks from now. The time process was 
gradually brought closer until we could speak about her pain a minute ago, 
now, and in a little while. She was able to relax and allow herself to 
experience, with the help of thinking about her son, how her perception of 
pain had changed. Creating a time-line capitalizes on the inevitable process 
of change and turns it into a practical device for punctuating difference. 
The fictional explanation 
Hypnosis is often a strange experience for the subject and most of the time, if 
not always, leaves him/her with several questions. Questions can be 
responded to in various ways, depending on the epistemological departure 
point of the hypnotist. If the hypnotist holds the idea that hypnosis is a distinct 
state with distinct behaviors that make it hypnotic, his/her responses will be 
significantly different from those of someone seeing hypnosis as a 
consensually constructed domain of experience. The former position will 
imply that the hypnotist believes certain facts about hypnosis and may 
attempt to explain these to the subject. He/she may also be convinced that 
certain behaviors, as opposed to others, are hypnotic and may therefore 
disqualify, not notice, or be unsure in dealing with behaviors that do not fit the 
textbook description. 
A constructivist approach, however, is essentially a position where the 
hypnotist knows that his/her role is that of facilitating the qualification of the 
experiences of the subject as hypnotic. The emphasis is, as has been 
discussed in previous chapters, on the givens of the situation, on the unique 
qualities and contributions of all involved. As such the hypnotist is not bound 
66 
by the idea of the "right" answers to questions that may arise during hypnosis. 
The guiding principle is rather' that of usefulness. And hence the hypnotist 
may make up fictional explanations and arguments in pursuit of expanding 
the hypnotic description. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented the expansion of the hypnotic description as a 
process of filling out the hypnotic space, done by developing a repertoire of 
behaviors mutually defined as hypnotic and facilitating dialogues that reflect 
the hypnotic logic. Hypnotic behaviors tend to have a clear goal (a specific 
behavior) in mind that the hypnotist works towards. Hypnotic dialogues, on 
the other hand, are more open-ended processes that emphasize hypnotic 
thinking rather than any specific description. Both specific behaviors and 
dialogues are useful, though, in expanding the hypnotic repertoire and 
engagement. 
In the following chapter the hypnotic description as a continually evolving 
system will be discussed. It will be shown how the behaviors that were 
developed and defined as hypnotic, and the ideas and conversational domain 
described in Chapter 3, all fit together as a functional and coherent whole. 
The focus will be on the subject's mastery of the hypnotic description and the 
emerging ability to initiate and make hypnotic distinctions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FACILITATING THE COHERENCE OF THE HYPNOTIC REALITY 
"He [Don Juan] pointed out that everyone who comes 
into contact with a child is a teacher who incessantly 
describes the world to him, until the moment when the 
child is capable of perceiving the world as it is described. 
( ... ] From that moment on, however, the child is a 
member. He knows the description of the world; and 
his membership becomes full-fledged [ ... ] when he is 
capable of making all the proper perceptual 
interpretations which, by conforming to that 
description, validate it" (Castaneda, 1972, p.8-9, 
author's emphasis, italics in original). 
In the preceding two chapters the process was presented by which the 
subject is exposed to, and becomes familiar with, the hypnotic description. In 
setting up the hypnotic reality the hypnotist introduces the subject to a 
different way or logic for making sense of the world. This is done in a way that 
prevents him/her from making sense of events in the way that he/she is used 
to. In other words, his/her habitual description of the world is disrupted and a 
new one is offered. In expanding the hypnotic reality the same process is 
used, although the emphasis shifts towards filling out the hypnotic domain. 
This is done by developing a repertoire of behaviors that are consensually 
defined as hypnotic, and by engaging in dialogues based on the hypnotic 
logic. These two processes facilitate the acquisition of the hypnotic 
description by the subject. In this chapter the hypnotic description is 
presented as a system that conserves its own organization and fit with other 
systems. This organization is described as the internal coherence of the 
hypnotic system, which is the way it systematically and functionally fits 
together (Dell, 1982). The fit with other systems is discussed in terms of the 
system's coherence as it intersects with other systems. 
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Defining coherence 
Coherence is neither something that someone does, nor is it an objective 
quality that can be measured in some way. It is a descriptive device that I find 
useful in making sense of the way the hypnotic domain fits together as a 
system, and to understand how the hypnotic system intersects with other 
cognitive domains and social settings. The concept of coherence is useful, 
firstly to assess the extent to which the hypnotic encounter has evolved into a 
domain of reality, and secondly, to establish the extent to which the subject 
has mastered the description in being able to initiate, validate, and conserve it 
as a domain of existence. 
Some qualities of a coherent hypnotic system 
Participation in validating and expanding the hypnotic description 
In the introductory quotation by Castaneda it was said that membership is 
achieved through learning to make the proper perceptual interpretations. In 
other words, the subject has learned how to make sense of the world by using 
"hypnotic lenses", so to speak, as opposed to the lenses of everyday life. In 
expanding the hypnotic reality the subject was assisted in validating hypnotic 
distinctions made by the hypnotist. The emphasis now shifts towards eliciting 
hypnotic distinctions from the subject. An example of simple validation will be 
with Andrea when I say "I notice that you are looking much more relaxed and 
at ease" and she only needs to nod in agreement as validation. Facilitating 
her actually making the hypnotic distinction will require a more open-ended 
question, such as "what has changed in this room since you've gone into a 
trance?". Her response that the room "seems warmer and more comfortable" 
illustrates her ability to make perceptual interpretations within the new 
description. 
In accepting, making and initiating hypnotic descriptions of experiences and 
events the subject's membership also implies that he/she participates in 
expanding the hypnotic description. Formerly the hypnotist carried a large 
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part of the responsibility for finding ways of expanding the idea and reality of 
hypnosis. As the subject acquires both actual mastery of the description, as 
well as a sense of mastery in making hypnotic distinctions, he/she may start 
to qualify his/her own behaviors as hypnotic. At this stage it will be possible 
for the hypnotist to ask the subject "do you think you are hypnotized?" and the 
subject, as with Judy, will respond that she knows she is hypnotized because 
of the sensation of lightness in her stomach. This is an example of the subject 
having learned to validate his/her own behavior as hypnotic. An example of 
the subject expanding his/her behavior may be him/her saying, like Andrea 
did, that he/she knows that he/she will be able to perform a specific behavior, 
without this behavior actually being requested. Hence the subject takes the 
initiative to expand their hypnotic repertoire without being prompted to do so. 
Ability to initiate perceptual interpretations within the new description 
The coherent hypnotic system is characterized by the subject's role becoming 
more active and spontaneous. An example of this will be when the subject 
starts to initiate perceptual interpretations within the hypnotic description 
without prompting. This indicates that the subject has learned the new 
description and is able to realize his/her autopoiesis within it. An example of 
this is when Catherine experienced an auditory hallucination prior to 
undergoing a medical procedure. She was experiencing significant fear and 
the auditory hallucination helped her to calm down. Apart from showing her 
mastery of the hypnotic description, this shows that the hypnotic description 
has become a viable behavioral option (or structural change) as a way of 
conserving her autonomy. In this way she initiated a hypnotic behavior as a 
way of organizing her experience of the operation. 
Changing roles of subject and hypnotist 
As the subject masters the hypnotic description or logic he/she becomes an 
equal member in constructing the hypnotic reality. This does not mean that 
he/she was passive in former stages, but rather that he/she fulfilled a different 
role. The implication is that the hypnotist's role changes and becomes more 
facilitative and co-operative in terms of the content of the hypnotic domain. 
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The hypnotist's emphasis shifts from validating hypnotic behaviors to 
validating the hypnotic descriptions of the subject. Throughout the process 
the hypnotist does not "hypnotize" anyone, but merely organizes what is 
already present in the situation (Fourie & Lifschitz, 1985). 
Over the course of time the organizational behaviors of all participants 
change. Initially my participation in hypnosis with Judy, for example, can be 
described as active, structuring and leading. I was the stage manager and 
director, and prompted the script. Over time this role changed to become 
more cooperative as she learned the text of the hypnotic setting. And still 
later, she became the one that actively defined where she wanted to move 
into the hypnotic description. In complementing this change, my role became 
more responsive, facilitative and validating. 
Independent functioning of the hypnotic description 
A further characteristic of a coherent hypnotic description is its ability to stay 
intact. Castaneda (1981) speaks about the importance of the attention staying 
fixed once shifted. As a social reality this is not a quality of any specific 
participant, but the ability of all involved to interact consistently and repeatedly 
within the hypnotic description without recourse to the ordinary description. 
Initially hypnosis as dialogue between the subject and the hypnotist is not 
established. This becomes evident in the initial stages of hypnosis when the 
subject attempts to engage the hypnotist in an ordinary conversation about 
events and experiences. As the hypnosis progresses the subject learns to 
stay in the hypnotic description, performing perceptions from within the 
description, as opposed to trying to make sense of experiences by explaining 
them as ordinary events. 
Clarity of the hypnotic description 
Castaneda (1993) says "we know it by the clarity of our perception. The 
clearer the view [ ... ] the greater the cohesion" (p.70). In the same way 
coherence of the hypnotic system is marked by clarity of it as a domain of 
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reality. This can best be explained with reference to our everyday experience. 
We experience our bodies, surroundings, emotions, thoughts and interactions 
with a certain thoughtless trust and confidence. In Chapter 2 it was said that 
we take our description of the world as being real and as disconnected from 
our own role in making it so. The same quality, perhaps to a limited extent, is 
found with the coherent system. Hence, as Judy masters the hypnotic 
description, there is a certain trust in her experiences. She is hypnotized and 
what she is experiencing is completely real in hypnosis. This quality of being 
in an experience without excessive scrutiny or questioning, is what is meant 
by clarity. It is the ease with which we experience our perceptions without 
doubt, as if we are merely passive receivers of information. 
Continual and independent evolution 
The hypnotic description evolves within, and becomes, a social system. It is a 
consensual venture between participants and as such can be understood as 
being a relationship. Every hypnotic description is unique because it 
constitutes a unique relationship. As such, the hypnotic description is a 
shared reality and is made up, as are all social realities, through interaction. 
This interaction has been described in Chapter 2 as co-ontogenic structural 
coupling. What this really says, is that those involved in the hypnotic 
description as a social system are going through individual structural changes 
that are connected to the structural changes of each other. Just as hypnosis 
with one person is completely different from hypnosis with another, so 
hypnosis with the same person is always new and different. Hypnosis is not a 
static entity or state, but a relationship that is fluid. Hypnosis as such 
continues to evolve as a distinct plastic system that cannot be pinned down. 
Conservation of the hypnotic system 
The hypnotic description as system is a higher order functional unit that 
conserves its members in being both the medium and the manifestation of 
their autopoiesis. As a way of knowing, the hypnotic description organizes 
itself by becoming ordered, repeatable and reliable (Von Glasersfeld, 1984). It 
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is this internal coherence that provides each hypnotic system with its unique 
identity. The hypnotic system conserves certain relations between its 
members, and hence the system can be understood as a being a relationship 
itself. In the previous paragraph it was said that the hypnotic system 
continually changes and evolves. This is complemented by the system 
conserving the relations between its members. Hence the system conserves 
its organization by continually undergoing changes in terms of the actual 
behaviors by members that constitute it. The changes in behavior, taking 
place over time, conserve the identity of the system as being hypnotic. Should 
the hypnotic system no longer conserve its organization, that which makes it 
"hypnotic", it will cease to exist as such. In this sense a hypnotic system may 
be constituted as consisting of the role of "hypnotist" and the role of "subject". 
These roles are necessary for it to exist as hypnotic system. This may not, 
however, be true of all hypnotic systems. 
Dealing with perturbations 
The hypnotic description is conservative, which means it is, like all 
descriptions, resistant to change and therefore attempts to eliminate 
perturbations (Von Glasersfeld, 1988). A perturbation is anything that poses a 
potential threat to the conservation of the hypnotic system. Hence the subject 
opening his/her eyes in the middle of the session may be seen as a 
perturbation. In itself, such a behavior or event carries no meaning, but it is 
the way the system reorganizes around the behavior that will define it. When 
this happened with Andrea I commented that it is fine if she wants to open her 
eyes while she is in a trance, and that people often want to see how different 
their surroundings will look when hypnotized. This was my dealing with a 
perturbation as hypnotist. 
As the hypnotic description becomes coherent the subject becomes capable 
of dealing with perturbations without reverting to the ordinary description. One 
example of this took place when someone walked into the room when I was 
doing hypnosis with Judy. The person did not know what we were doing. I got 
up, went to him, and explained to him in a lowered voice that Judy was 
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hypnotized. Judy had remained in her position when the person walked in. In 
this way she dealt with the perturbation by not responding from within her 
ordinary description. Remaining on the couch is hence an action of dealing 
with a perturbation. 
Another example comes from my hypnosis with Sharon. After our session I 
discussed what had happened with her with an observer. The observer stated 
that she did not think that Sharon was hypnotized. Sharon responded that 
although she only seemed to be lying on the couch with her eyes closed, she 
actually couldn't move when she tried to. In this way the subject dealt with the 
perturbation. As the hypnotic description evolves the subject becomes 
confident in validating the experience, not only to him/herself, but also to 
others. 
Ability to move between different descriptions 
With the subject's mastery of the hypnotic description comes the ability to 
move with greater ease between .different descriptions. In traditional language 
this means that he/she can more rapidly switch between being in a "trance" 
and being in ordinary awareness. Less time and fewer punctuations are 
necessary in demarcating a context or specific interaction as hypnotic. Hence 
I can have a conversation with Ruth and ask her to experience what she 
experienced several months before, during hypnosis. The completeness of 
her experience then allows her to use my prompt and the idea of what she 
experienced to shift her whole embodiment back to that experience. With 
some subjects it may be necessary to use an agreed-on prompt to punctuate 
the context, such as a phrase or a tap on the shoulder. 
As subjects master the hypnotic description they may spontaneously initiate 
such a switch from one description to the other. After a session with Judy I 
phoned her to follow up on how she was doing. She was talking about how 
easy she found switching between the two descriptions after our session 
where we explored her "blocking" (discussed in Chapter 3). She commented 
that she would probably be able to experience the same things she was 
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experiencing earlier if she wanted to. In this way she could allow herself to 
switch to the hypnotic description while on the phone and without requiring 
any other punctuation. 
Interconnected system of behaviors 
In setting up the hypnotic reality the hypnotist uses whatever is given in luring 
the subject to the hypnotic description, so to speak. This may mean using an 
idea, such as a child that is missed, or the desire to get rid of a headache, or 
the pleasant memory of a visit to a cathedral. These are all possible starting 
points from which the hypnotist expands the experience in developing an 
interconnected system of behaviors. These may include ideas, perceptions, 
actions, etc, all of which are connected into a functional unit. 
Independence from initial spatial contextual boundaries 
In setting up the context for the unfolding of the hypnotic description space is 
often used as a handy and basic marker of the hypnotic domain. Hence the 
subject knows that in that position, or seat, or that room, he/she experiences 
hypnosis. Not only does this serve to punctuate the commencement of the 
hypnotic context, but it also provides a clear boundary from the ordinary 
activities and descriptions. As the subject learns the hypnotic description 
he/she needs fewer and often less concrete cues to punctuate or indicate the 
hypnotic domain. Hence there is less dependence on the spatial contextual 
boundaries that may initially have been necessary. This means that with 
minimal cues participants can shift to the hypnotic description in different 
spatial contexts. An example of this is Margaret's ability to enter the hypnotic 
description in different settings with minimal cues. She learned how to create 
her own behavioral markers that will help recreate the hypnotic description in 
whichever setting she finds herself. 
Independence from initial relational context 
Following from the above is that the hypnotic description can also be shifted 
into different relational contexts. Although initial interaction may therefore 
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have been restricted to hypnotist and subject, the hypnotic description can be 
initiated in other social settings. This is a challenge to the subject since 
he/she must find a way of dealing with the presence of others without 
reverting to his/her ordinary description. In my experience this is something 
that is easier with the more coherent hypnotic system. An example of this is 
with Judy. During most of our sessions it was just the two of us present. As 
she became competent at making and validating the hypnotic description I 
asked her to move into the hypnotic description in a setting that has not been 
defined previously as hypnotic and with a group of people with who she had 
never manifested her hypnotic behaviors. She was able to do this with great 
proficiency. 
Intersection and fit with other descriptions and contexts 
Dell (1985) points out that, in order for something to exist, it has to be 
structurally coupled to the world in which it exists. In the same way the 
hypnotic system needs to fit into the rest of the subject's world. He/she has to 
be able to integrate the idea of the hypnotic description with his/her ordinary 
descriptions without it posing a threat. There is no way of prescribing how this 
will be done, neither by the hypnotist nor by the subject. Every subject lives in 
different descriptions and these descriptions, as the hypnotic descriptions, 
serve differently but uniquely in conserving his/her autonomy. The subject's 
mastery of the hypnotic system allows him/her to fit the hypnotic description 
with these other descriptions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented the evolving coherence of the hypnotic system as 
being its functional and structural interconnectedness, and distinctness, as 
social system. It was described how coherence also refers to the subject's 
acquisition of membership to the hypnotic description. This membership is 
manifested in his/her ability to initiate, make and validate hypnotic 
descriptions. This goes hand-in-hand with the changing role of the hypnotist, 
who becomes more facilitative. The hypnotic system exists as a veritable 
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reality or description that is less bound to spatial and relational contexts, can 
intersect with other descriptions and contexts, and effectively deals with 
perturbations. Lastly it incorporates the totality of the participants, especially 
the subject, and as such exists as a veritable reality in which he/she 





This dissertation presented the praxis of hypnosis in terms of the behaviors of 
the hypnotist in facilitating an embodied description mutually qualified as 
hypnosis. This process was described with reference to my own experiences 
with hypnosis. This chapter will provide a brief overview of my ideas of 
possible implications for research, treatment and training when approaching 
hypnosis from a constructivist epistemology. The remainder of the chapter will 
contextualize this dissertation, my position as author, hypnosis and 
constructivism. 
Implications 
Implications and recommendations for research 
The hypnotist as researcher can be described as an artist that selects and 
organizes pieces of glass and ceramic to create a mosaic. We do not look at 
the product, art, as distinct from the artist, but see it as an statement of the 
artist. Just as art reflects the artist, so research, from a constructivist 
perspective, reflects the researcher's idiosyncratic way of researching, of 
selecting and combining materials into a pattern or organization that makes 
sense to those who look at it. It can therefore be said that research both 
reflects and is the manifestation of the researcher's autopoiesis. Research· 
does not discover facts, ideas or patterns, but is a construction. This 
construction is a human behavior, and as was discussed in Chapter 2, all 
human behaviors are autopoietic. Constructivist research hence places the 
emphasis on the descriptive and participatory behaviors of the researcher in 
the research process. The researcher is not only viewed as an inseparable 
part of the research process, but the research itself is seen as reflecting the 
description of the researcher in the way actions and ideas are specified, 
described and organized. The implication for research is that research 
findings are unique and inseparable from the autopoietic discourse from 
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which they arise, and attempts to duplicate research findings, whether 
successful or not, reflects an inability to appreciate this. 
Research exists both in, and as part of, the social intersection of autonomous 
individuals in language. Research is a social reality and is only valid when it is 
defined as adequate by those defined as capable of making such distinctions 
of adequacy. In other words, research, like all other behaviors, is autopoietic 
therein that it allows the person (the researcher) to specify and conserve 
his/her identity. This is done in intersection with other autopoietic beings. 
Research reflects both the researcher's conservation of his/her identity, as 
well as his/her fit with other people and ideas within the research domain. The 
research community's validation of the researcher indicates that his/her 
membership to that community is being conserved. And research will only be 
validated if the ideas and descriptions that it contains in turn allow the 
research community to conserve their idiosyncratic behaviors as members 
and autopoietic entities. As such research conserves not only the identity and 
membership of the researcher, but also that of the larger community in which 
it is defined as adequate. Research, like all other consensual cognitive 
domains, conserves the invested interests of the researcher, subject and 
consumer. 
The usefulness of research lies therein that all research reflects a selection, 
organization and description of events and ideas into patterns, and these 
patterns are useful in turn to other researchers and hypnotists in making 
sense of events and ideas. Hence research findings should be considered for 
their usefulness rather than "truthfulness". What we do when we publish 
research "findings" is to communicate our idiosyncratic ways of making 
sense. This "making sense" is in turn validated by the larger hypnosis and/or 
research community as adequate action. When it is validated as such, it 
becomes part of the repertoire of what is considered acceptable research 
practice, in the same way that a new behavior is consensually defined as 
hypnotic. This means that other researchers and hypnotists can "make sense" 
in a similar way. Research findings hence add towards the "research 
repertoire". What is communicated and validated through research findings is 
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not objective facts or discoveries, but processes of making sense or 
describing reality. Every research report can therefore be understood as 
communicating an implicit, and usually unacknowledged, description of the 
world. To understand the explicit research content without the implicit 
epistemological assumptions is ignorant and more likely to lead to the 
reification of findings as if they were disconnected from the process that found 
them, or the finder (or, from the research and the researcher). 
Human beings are all structurally determined, and the idea of one person (the 
researcher) unilaterally controlling the behavior of another (the subject) is not 
accepted. For the same reason no attempt was made in the research 
preceding this dissertation at establishing unilateral control over subject 
behaviors. The researcher, as with the hypnotist, can only change his/her 
own behaviors. Constructivist research will therefore emphasize the 
importance of the behavior of the researcher. There will be no attempts at 
controlling the research situation, since it is assumed that behavior is 
internally and structurally defined, and as such is not the direct result of the 
environment. Research can hence be defined as the curious observation by 
the researcher of both his/her own behavioral changes, and those of the 
participants, as forming part of an inseparable circuit and existing within a 
specified domain of actions, ideas and distinctions. Constructivist research is 
the curious participation of the researcher in an evolving reality where facts 
and findings are consensual artifacts that exist in language. 
In summarizing the ideas described above I will provide an image of the 
constructivist researcher. The constructivist researcher presents as 
somewhat of a paradox. He/she is irreverent about facts and findings since 
they are seen as consensual and autopoietic descriptions. In communicating 
his/her ideas he/she is aware that they reflect him/herself and hence he/she 
does not aim to convince others of their "realness", but rather attempts to 
portray circumstances of their usefulness. At the same time he/she can 
appreciate the ideas of others as equally valid descriptions. In balancing 
his/her irreverence the constructivist researcher takes his/her descriptions 
very serious and does not believe that "everything goes". He/she knows that 
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all descriptions have implications for future actions and distinctions, and is 
therefore careful in deciding which behavior to describe. The constructivist 
researcher adopts an attitude of curious experimentation and a willingness to 
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define him/herself as participant of the research process. He/she creates a 
domain of distinction and description where he/she organizes ideas to 
construct a pattern between distinctions. The fact that this pattern reflects the 
researcher does not invalidate it, but merely provides a qualifying context. 
The pattern or organization in turn allows others to conserve parts of 
themselves through the process of interacting with the organization. 
Implications for treatment 
All behaviors are active organizational events. The implication is that 
"someone suffering from a severe migraine" should be rephrased to read 
"someone organizing his/her current identity and adaptation to his/her context 
(including bodily events) by means of pain that allows him/her to conserve 
some part of a description". Applying a constructivist perspective thereby 
removes the ideas of linear cause and of symptoms as "things that happen to 
us". The hypnotist and therapist operating from a constructivist epistemology 
therefore see symptoms and other behavior as forming part of a complex web 
of relations where the symptom is an active and functional behavior. 
The type of interventions decided on during treatment is based on the 
epistemology used in making sense of behaviors. Within a constructivist 
mindset the hypnotist views all behavior as functional in conserving the 
identity and adaptation of the person. To change a specific behavior, the 
context of ideas, interactions, events, etc in which the behavior is functionally 
embedded, needs to be disrupted and reorganized. At the same time the 
hypnotist has to assist the person in continuing to conserve the ideas and 
relations that are conserved through the symptom, but to do this in a different 
way by means of different actions and distinctions. 
In treating problematic behaviors, such as pain, the hypnotist explores these 
behaviors in terms of location, intensity, etc. It would to inconsistent with 
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constructivist thinking to assume that he/she discovers these bits of 
information or facts. The act of dialoguing about anything (in this case the 
experience of pain) expands and develops that which is dialogued about. In 
this sense any enquiry into someone's experience in itself constitutes a 
change. Change is therefore an ongoing process. The constructivist hypnotist 
and therapist know this and facilitate change by changing the way he/she 
asks questions. 
The constructivist hypnotist assumes that all realities are continually in flux 
since the entities that constitute them, and the relations between them, are 
continually changing and evolving. Change and stability are hence inherent in 
our condition as humans, and the hypnotist/therapist is aware of this. He/she 
attempts to draw distinctions to make this change part of the dialogue as 
process that is already present, rather than as something that still needs to be 
achieved. Pragmatically this is useful since change is explored, rather than 
requested, and it is much more difficult to disqualify change since it is defined 
as part of the person's current repertoire. 
The constructivist hypnotist is not an agent of linear change. His/her role in 
disrupting the subject's ordinary description is active, but how the subject will 
deal with the perturbation is determined by his/her structure. The hypnotist 
therefore does not adhere to set techniques in achieving therapeutic goals, 
but experiment with a variety of ideas in an attempt to find a fit with the 
subject that will allow a change in the desired area. As such he/she is flexible 
and can adjust to different and unique situations with greater ease. 
Constructivist hypnosis redefines parts of the subject's current established 
behavioral repertoire as hypnotic skills and competence. This is achieved by 
redefining everyday behaviors as hypnotic achievements. In itself, this is an 
empowering reframing of the subject's daily actions. The hypnotist does not 
see the subject as the passive recipient of experiences. Communicating in 
this way redefines the subject's role in his/her life to one that is more active 
and effective. And such a redefinition allows the subject more opportunity and 
validation for growth and development. 
82 
What emerges from the hypnotic encounter is a co-constructed reality. It is 
not a series of facts. The hypnotist/therapist has to be careful, though, since 
such functional information is expressed in a context that he/she is part of and 
he/she has to be careful of what he/she validates as "real". He/she also has to 
be selective of what is brought into the conversational domain since all 
distinctions will not be equally useful in working towards therapeutic goals. 
Hypnosis is a useful device for treatment, but not treatment in itself. It is a 
specific conversational domain. For some people the reorganization of ideas 
and expectations may carry the connotation that, within the hypnotic context, 
they can perform different behaviors and still conserve a certain identity. 
Hence someone can change a behavior and then qualify what happened by 
saying "it was the hypnosis". In this way a person can undergo a change (for 
whichever reason), but ascribe it to the hypnosis and hence disqualify 
him/herself as the agent of change. In hypnosis the "rules" are different - and 
sometimes all people need is a change of rules to make changes that they 
really want to make, but cannot make otherwise because of the implications 
that will go with such change. 
Hypnosis is a useful idea. In treatment this idea is sometimes a powerful 
enough tool, without even engaging in the interactions known as hypnosis. At 
the same time the idea of hypnosis will be different in every situation. Since 
the constructivist hypnotist does not have a reified idea of what hypnosis is or 
should be, and what not, this does not create a problem, but rather a resource 
and opportunity. He/she realizes that with the divergent ideas about hypnosis 
that people bring, they also bring divergent ideas about alternate conditions 
for change. He/she capitalizes and expands on these ideas of change in 
achieving treatment goals. 
Implications for training 
I was fortunate to be trained to think about hypnosis from a constructivist 
perspective. My interest in hypnosis pushed me to experiment and build up 
confidence in constructing hypnotic descriptions. In speaking to my peers, 
however, I often find reluctance to make use of hypnosis, even though they 
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underwent the same amount of theoretical training as I did. The key reason 
for this seems to be that they do not know what the hypnotist actually does 
during hypnosis. This also reflects my own initial experience and is what led 
me to start conceptualizing this dissertation in an attempt to delineate the 
actual praxis involved. Hypnosis seems to have about it an aura of obscurity 
that maintains the association of it being something esoteric from medieval 
times. This is completely unnecessary. The process involved in hypnosis is 
simple, but not easy. It is simple in terms of what needs to be done, but 
difficult in terms of the changes required on the part of the hypnotist. 
This dissertation has emphasized that a large part of hypnosis is about the 
changes the hypnotist has to produce in his/her own behavior in constructing 
the hypnotic description. The experience for making these changes can only 
be obtained through the actual process of doing so. In the same way that the 
subject needs to gain experiential knowledge of the new description, the 
hypnotist needs to do the same. For training, the recommendation will 
therefore be an approach that emphasizes both theory and practice. The 
theory of constructivist thinking will allow the student to learn to conceptualize 
in the way discussed in this text. The practical component will include 
coaching and guidance in actually doing hypnosis, from start to finish. 
Training that does not persist until students have the confidence to do 
hypnosis at the drop of the hat is, in my opinion as student, more likely than 
not, to result in them not seeing it is a possible resource in their work. In other 
words, they will not see it as a viable behavior in their therapeutic repertoire 
since they have not learned to conserve their identity as therapists within it. 
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Contextualization 
This dissertation is a secondary description 
"We discover that our experience is that we find 
ourselves observing, talking or acting, and that any 
explanation or description of what we do is secondary to 
our experience of finding ourselves in the doing of what 
we do" (Maturana, 1988, p.26). 
The preceding chapters are a summary of my description of facilitating 
different hypnotic discourses. This description is, however, a secondary 
description and does not reflect the same description that was involved when 
I was engaged in the said discourses. A description is a functional moment-
to-moment interface through which we conserve ourselves by organizing our 
world of experiences. This means that any description offered afterwards is 
not the same as the description embodied and embedded in the unique 
relational context at the time. 
Does the above invalidate the descriptions made in this text? No. Every 
description is valid and functional within the context in which it consensually 
arises. What is not valid, though, is to assume that the former description is 
"factually" conveyed by this dissertation. The statement of this text is that 
such a "factual" report will never be possible since what we "know" is 
constructed in language as a functional organizational event between people. 
This is merely about reminding ourselves that a// descriptions are functional -
even this one. An epistemological stance can only be taken seriously if it is 
taken to its logical consequences as applied to the actions that embody it. 
These are my actions. 
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The dissertation as secondary description 
"[ ... ] cognitive domains are closed operational domains: 
an observer cannot get out of a cognitive domain by 
operating in it. Similarly, an observer cannot observe a 
cognitive domain by operating in it. An observer can get 
out of a cognitive domain, and observe it, only through 
the recursive consensuality of language by consensually 
specifying another cognitive domain in which the first is 
an object of consensual distinctions" (Maturana, 1988, 
p.61 ). 
Every description exists, and is functional within, a specific interactional and 
time-spatial context. While I was therefore involved in doing the hypnosis 
described in this dissertation, I was operating from a specific description. In 
writing this dissertation, however, I created another description. Although the 
content may seem to be the same, it is a different description that takes place 
in a different domain. My actual embodied description in doing hypnosis, and 
the one embodied in creating this text, are different and belong to different 
consensual domains. However, as Maturana's quote points out, it is useful 
and necessary to specify a different cognitive domain in which the first can be 
described. In doing so I am, as author, able to describe my own description 
without staying within the cognitive recursiveness that constitutes it. In other 
words, writing a dissertation allows me to organize the reality of my hypnosis 
in a different way since I no longer have to perform the behaviors necessary 
to remain viable within that immediate setting. 
The dissertation as conservation by the author 
I used the metaphor of an artist creating a mosaic. In the same way I am, as 
author and researcher, the one who selects and combine ideas, experiences, 
thoughts and discussions into the description that is presented here. These 
are all organized and presented in a way that must make sense to the reader, 
but more important, make sense to me. As such it reflects my own 
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conservation of ideas, not only about hypnosis, but about my totality. The 
dissertation is therefore not an objective end-product, but an active 
construction, organization and communication of ideas that both reflect and is 
my own act of conservation. "[A]ll actions by a human system can [ ... ]be seen 
as the verbal or nonverbal statement of ideas aimed at the conservation of its 
autonomy" (Fourie, 1993, p.226). In doing hypnosis, and in writing this 
dissertation, I am conserving my autonomy. 
The dissertation as adaptation by the author 
There are many ways for me to describe my experiences. I know, however, 
that this text must reflect adequacy or effectiveness (Maturana, 1987b; 
Zeleny, 1996) to those who will read it. It is a text written within the context of 
academia where it forms part of the requirements of a master's degree. The 
text is written with that in mind. It should show certain skills such as the use of 
references, presenting a logical argument, etc. As such the experiences 
themselves are perhaps even less important than the way in which they are 
described, and specifically described in relation to other literature on the 
subject. This does not disqualify the text. Once again, it is merely a statement 
about the context of the description that influences and restricts what is said 
and how it is said. I need to show my ability to comply, to a reasonable 
degree, with the requirements set out. This is one area in which this 
dissertation specifies and conserves my identity as competent academic, and 
my membership to the academic community. In the same manner this text 
must reflect certain distinctions, comments, statements, etc that will be 
qualified as adequate by the psychology community in order for me to 
conserve my identity as psychologist and establish my membership to that 
community. 
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The dissertation must also fit with a larger consensual community 
"All realities are not equally valid or equally useful. Their 
usefulness or validity is determined, however, not by any 
;'objective" norm, but by the ways they fit with the wishes, 
attributions, ideas, and conceptions of the people 
partaking -in their construction .. And this does not refer 
only to the people physically present in the particular 
context. Any constructed reality must fit with ideas from 
many sources, such as cultural and religious norms, folk 
wisdom, novels, the media and ideas from other cases as 
well as research reports" (Fourie, 1996c, p.17). 
This dissertation must illustrate my ability to make certain distinctions that are 
. considered adequate action by the consensual communities .of academia and 
•psychology. In· the same way it must fit within a larger community - it must 
.• _,make. sense Jn. terms .. of. the. ideas, thoughts. and beliefs about hypnosis. in 
general. As author I must be careful in my selection of "facts". All realities are 
not equally valid. There are many possible experiences that I may describe 
here. Yet, some may sound "strange" and hence I exclude it. And in doing so 
I illustrate my ability to act within the specific cognitive domain of those who 
read this text, or, I write in a way that make sense to people. 
Hypnosis is also_ just a definition 
·Just as all realities are consensually constructed, so hypnosis, too, "is the 
definition of a constructed reality" (Fourie, 1995, p.303). In this dissertation 
the idea of hypnosis was used as an organizational metaphor, or description, 
to make sense of what I did. Does this mean what I did was not really 
hypnosis? No. My actions were consensually defined as hypnotic and, as 
such, the idea or definition of hypnosis forms an integral part of the 
description. 
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However, in several of the cases referred to in this text the word "hypnosis" 
was never used. Yet, within this secondary description they become part of 
the group of subjects, viz. those with whom I uttered, the word. What makes 
something hypnotic is, in part, that it fits certain consensual criteria of the 
·hypnotic community. But even if it manifested those criteria, without the 
··definition, it is not· hypnosis. Hypnosis is· a conceptual reality that only· exists ·in 
·language. What are the implications of all of the above? 
Consensually defining a setting and behavior with the subject as hypnotic is 
one level at which the definition can be made. As the ideas of the hypnotic 
community have evolved, we can also make the definition amongst each 
other. That is to say, in our secondary description we define what happened 
as hypnosis. And we use explanations to validate the latter. Whichever way it 
is done, it becomes hypnosis through being defined as such. This can take 
·" .place.consensually with the subject, or consensually within the larger hypnotic 
··community. What is clear, however, is that defining phenomena as hypnotic, 
."·~no :matter within which consensual'domain" is still the attribution of such 
meaning. 
Constructivism is one of many realist ideas 
In introducing this text it was made clear that everything said here was said, 
and only made sense, if the reader temporarily assumed as valid the 
epistemological assumptions in which it is embedded. Constructivism is an 
epistemology, and was presented as being one of many epistemologies. 
Ideas about the conservation of autonomy are just ideas that I, as observer, 
selected as organizing principle (Fourie, 1993). Constructivism is an idea held 
by myself and other authors. Although it is an epistemology, it also contains 
elements of realism, or ontological claims. Structural determinism is such a 
claim. It is because I am aware that constructivism contains ontological 
claims, that I did not present criticism of other epistemological stances in this 
text. Constructivism is just another idea, and I have neither need nor desire to 
reify it as anything more than what it is. 
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Final remark 
In setting out to write this dissertation my hope was to arrive at a formulation 
of the practice of constructing hypnotic realities. The process of 
conceptualization and description, and of responding to feedback when 
people did .not know.what I meant, has been useful in clarifying for. myself the 
-praxis of hypnosis. It is a praxis that is simple yet intricate, and something that 
can take many forms depending on the epistemology in which it is rooted. Yet 
I am left preferring an epistemology that leaves me both empowered and 
humble. Empowered in the awareness and responsibility of my contribution to 
the construction of domains of reality, but humble in knowing that my best 
hypnotic achievements means nothing if they are not validated by another. 
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